HISTORY OF ASA OPERATIONS IN KOREA

94 pgs
(PS)

II. BACKGROUND

This document presents a summary of COMINT operations conducted by ASA facilities during the course of hostilities in Korea. To familiarize the reader with the ASA mission and achievements during the period, it is believed advisable to discuss briefly pre-Korean developments prior to focusing on the area of reference.

Preceding Korea — specifically in the post World War II years — ASA underwent considerable transition. Coincident with general attrition in the military establishment and concentration on the then-called "strategic effort", a long-range peacetime program was underway. One feature of this was reorganization of ASA COMINT operations world-wide. Another was a general reduction in personnel. These brought general deterioration of mobile COMINT units, and modification of their respective missions. Elsewhere, the lack of men, money, and equipment limited overall operations to minimum requirements with which the basic mission could be carried out. Despite this, the Agency continued to record success in meeting its responsibility to the Army and did not, for one moment, depart from the theory that it was a continuous organization, when it appeared that some doubt existed as to its future.

On 1 July 1949, activation of the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) was announced by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). This was to be the coordinating facility for fulfilling high level cryptological

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requirements on a continuing basis. Its mission was defined as that of responsibility for processing high level COMINT to include

Per NSA (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 Under this arrangement, ASA was to furnish COMINT to AFSA derived from its units and/or fixed facilities.

In part, the formation of AFSA meant the beginning of a new interpretation of the Agency's role in the COMINT field. Whereas ASA had enjoyed full responsibility for the high level COMINT mission, its passing to AFSA resulted in confusion, mass transfer of technical personnel, and new concern for the Agency's existence. Immediate reorganization along military lines followed and planning was completed for the accomplishment of a mutual AFSA-ASA mission, accentuating formation of TOE units in tactical support of field commanders. This development was the beginning of what had been preconceived to be the future role of ASA in the COMINT field.

On 20 February 1950, the long awaited clarification came. G-2, Department of the Army (DA) outlined the future responsibilities and functions of the Agency. It was established that ASA would formulate and implement plans, policies, and doctrines on COMINT for the Army, and coordinate the Army's cryptologic responsibility as assigned by the JCS. Thus, ASA became integral to the services.

Meanwhile, AFSA drew farther away on a course toward ultimate nationalization.* Fixed stations commanded by ASA, but with

* AFSA became the National Security Agency (NSA) on 22 Dec 1952.

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AFSA-controlled operational missions, appeared. Mobile military units were scheduled for activation with primary missions assigned by ASA for direct COMINT and COMSEC support of commanding generals in the field and with secondary AFSA missions. Planning was well advanced, when on 25 June 1950, South Korea was invaded, thus commencing a new period in the history of the Agency.

The specific concern from this point is the role played by ASA in the conduct of COMINT operations throughout the course of hostilities. Basically, it is a history of expansion following attrition, a gradual build-up of units and facilities in the Pacific to meet requirements and provide support to the US Eighth Army. It is to be remembered, however, that ASA activity was world-wide during this period; developments in the Far East were only one aspect of the entire operation. The shift in emphasis and the results obtained are discussed in their true perspective and disclose an interesting record of participation and achievement.

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III. D-DAY (25 JUNE 1950) TO INTERVENTION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST FORCES.

Coincident with the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, priority was given by the Army Security Agency to the organization of new units to support existing and proposed US armed forces in Korea. Also, adequate training, facilities, supplies, and equipment had to be provided. To man these units, DA authorized an increase of 1668 military spaces, 712 of which were for direct support of the Eighth US Army in Korea.[1] Enlistment quota was then raised from 155 to 300 men per month,[2] and direct recruiting of enlisted men carried out in five of the principal cities in the country.[3] Officers were obtained, for the most part, by direct assignment to the ASA from other branches of the Army, from civilian components, and from Agency enlisted personnel.

Meanwhile, additions to Agency fy 1951 requirements for Signal Corps equipment were prepared to cover expansion of the 51st Signal Service Detachment, the 111th Signal Service Company, and the 126th Signal Service Company (tactical units in the Far East); also the 53d Signal Service Company and the 60th Signal Service Company (tactical units in the ZI). In turn, Signal Corps equipment was requisitioned for expanding fixed station replacements for the 51st,

1. DF, G-2, DA to G-1, DA 9 Aug 1950, Comment 2, G-1, DA to G-2, DA 15 Sep 1950.
2. Ann. Rept. GAS 21, fy1951, P38, TAB 23.
3. Ibid. P16.

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the 111th, the 126th and the ASA School.[1]

By September 1950, ASA organization in support of the Eighth Army in Korea was determined. It was to consist of a communications reconnaissance group (CRG) at Army level, with three communications reconnaissance battalions (CRB) to serve the three corps in the theater. The battalion, through its headquarters and headquarters detachment at corps level, was to control the operations of two organized communications reconnaissance companies, the CRC (Int) and the CRC (Scty).[2]

As the 60th Signal Service Company at Fort Lewis, Washington appeared more nearly ready for Korea than existing tactical companies in the Far East Command (FECOM), immediate plans were initiated to prepare this company for overseas movement. It was brought up to full strength (7-O's, 4 WO, and 238 EM), equipped, and departed from the West Coast for FECOM on 20 Sep. Thus, the first complete ASA mobile COMINT unit was enroute to Korea.[3]

During September and October, 1950 planning for further maximum support in Korea was well underway. This resulted in the activation of the 304th CRB (28 Sep 1950),[4] the 352d CRC(Scty) (8 Oct),[5] the 501st CRG (18 Oct),[6] and the 301st CRB (20 Oct)[7] in the ZI. The committment of these units to ASA Pacific jurisdiction was only a matter of time.

1. Summ. Maj. Activities ASA (25 June 50 - 9 Sep 51), PP7-8.
2. Minutes, ASA Staff Mtg., 5 Sep 1950.
3. Ibid. 26 Sep 1950.
4. History, ASA, fy1951, Vol. I, P37.
5. Ibid. P82.
6. Ibid. P35.
7. Ibid. P36.

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Concurrent with these developments, Army Security Agency Pacific, Tokyo (ASA Pacific) was faced with an urgent requirement for personnel. It was determined at the start of hostilities that, due to limited operational personnel, a complete lack of Korean translators, and the need to place every available intercept facility

(b)(1)(b)(3) Per NSA

in direct support to GHQ FECOM, it was not possible to commit ASA personnel to Korea immediately. On 18 Sep 1950, however, the first provisional liaison detachment consisting of 3-O's and 5 EM was established in the combat zone in support of the Eighth Army. Its mission was one of coordination and control of intercept activity of a South Korean group carrying out missions on North Korean targets.* This unit was followed by the 50th Signal Service Detachment on 25 Sep. On 26 Sep, personnel of the two units were coordinated as ASA Pacific (Advance) and the liaison detachment deactivated.[1]

The 60th Signal Service Company arrived in Korea on 9 Oct 1950 and joined ASA Pacific (Advance). Following one week of field orientation and training, the company commenced operations.[2]

With the outbreak of hostilities, a reorientation of the intercept effort to Korean coverage became a paramount issue for

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* Note: This group, subsequently referred to herein as ROK Group M, was organized at the start of hostilities by South Koreans to intercept and process North Korean military traffic. It originally manned four (4) to six (6) intercept positions and furnished valuable key groups used by the North Koreans in one of their military systems to ASA Pacific. Throughout its existence, it was encouraged, equipped, and fed by ASA units in Korea, but no technical COMINT was furnished. (Source: Wkly Activity Rept. ASA Pacific, 7-13 July 1950).

1. Summ. Ann. Rept. ASA Pacific, fy1951, P12.
2. Ibid. P3.

attention to Korean nets had been practically nil. This is best illustrated by the status of fixed intercept facilities as of 1 July 1950 which follows:[1]

Per NSA

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

Per NSA

To effect this change, all available equipment at Hq ASA Pacific was (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 utilizing personnel of the 50th Sig Sv Det (a security monitoring facility), who were attached to and quartered at ASA Pacific until approximately 1 Sep 1950. At that time the 50th SSD, busily engaged in preparing for the move to Korea, turned over its (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86- to personnel on detached service from the 51st SSD who had been working with the 50th SSD since 27 June 50. This group of people continued to (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 some time after the summer of 1951. The priority (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 units was

1. Summ. Ann. Rept., ASA Pacific, 8621 AAU, fy1950, P27.

changed to coverage of Korean targets.[1] Meanwhile, at Washington, Hq ASA - AFSA directed ASA Pacific to employ as many positions as required for the intercept of Korean nets. The area of interest was specified as the entire Korean Peninsula as far north as the 45th Parallel. All nets with Korean characteristics were to be copied and all traffic forwarded to ASA Pacific then to AFSA for processing with minimum time delay.[2]

Dissemination of COMINT resulting from this change was effected through the Special Security Office (SSO) to the G-2 at theater level. Communications Intelligence Summaries (COMINTSUMS) were published daily by ASA Pacific from material available as of 0600 hours on the reporting day. In addition, spot items of COMINT were transmitted to G-2 by teletype as soon as they were observed. SSO, FECOM, in turn, relayed COMINT material to EUSAK and X Corps (then a separate command). Spot items were transmitted by radio to ASA and AFSA at Washington simultaneously with transmittal to G-2, FECOM.[3]

Increased COMINT traffic was handled through adjustment of operational work schedules by the Operations Branch, ASA Pacific and supporting sections. At one period personnel were working 12 hours a day, 7 days a week.[4]

Per NSA

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

The one Korean radio net being covered by position at the start of hostilities provided the wedge which made further intercept

1. Summ. Ann. Rept. ASA Pacific, 8621 AAU, fy1950, P28.
2. Ibid. P29.
3. Wkly Activity Rept. ASA Pacific, 30 June to 6 July 1950.
4. Summ.Ann. Rept. ASA Pacific, 8621 AAU, fy1951, P59.

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and exploitation of Korean material possible in the months that followed. Through application of maximum traffic analysis (TA), COMINT was initially produced from intercepted North Korean communications on 11 July 1950. On that day, five nets (four military, one unidentified) had been established. By the end of the month, the number had increased to ten.[1]

Between 25 June 1950 and mid-October 1950, approximately 35 North Korean cryptographic systems and/or system key changes were in effect. Among the first recovered were one military and two para military (police) systems. By 27 July, four separate reports of recoveries in the military system totaling 199 groups were received from AFSA. Processing of this traffic was the responsibility of ASA Pacific, and was maintained current by the cryptanalytic section and translators.

The partial recovery of a North Korean police system was reported by AFSA during this period, but difficulty in reading the system was encountered.[2] Recoveries of numerals and date time groups in another North Korean police system were made, but these were not sufficient to determine the value of the system to the ASA Pacific mission.[3] On 25 August, the solution of an irregular length digit group North Korean system was reported to AFSA by ASA Pacific.[4] A crib was found between two military systems which produced additional

1. Summ. Ann. Rept. ASA Pacific, 8621 AAU, fy1951, P49.
2. Wkly. Activity Rept. ASA Pacific, 20-27 July 1950.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid. 18-25 August 1950.

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code groups and verified earlier recoveries. Limited recoveries in other military systems were made also.[1] Two additional military systems were reported solved by ASA Pacific on 15 and 16 Sep. 1950. 151 messages in these were processed during the following week.[2]

With the assignment of translators by GHQ, FECOM to ASA Pacific during July 1950, the processing of translations commenced.[3] By 3 Aug 1950, 238 messages in various North Korean military and para-military systems were processed for translation. Thirty-eight (38) of these were translated and forwarded through the SSO to G-2, FECOM. The remainder were scanned for intelligence content and, in some instances, gists were prepared for G-2, FECOM.[4] The following week, 4-10 Aug 1950, 163 North Korean messages were decrypted.[5] During the week of 11-17 Aug 1950, 313 North Korean messages were decrypted by ASA Pacific, of which 70 contained COMINT of value to G-2, FECOM and the SSO.[6] During the first week of Sep 1950, translations began to arrive at ASA Pacific from AFSA which enabled comparative studies with material developed in the theater. Enlisted Korean translators were added to the translation section during the second week of ~~Sep~~ September, and a ~~total~~ TOTAL of 100 translations were produced during the month.[7]

Radio direction finding (D/F) in Korea was insignificant during this period. No coordinated D/F operations were conducted, as D/F nets had not been developed to any great degree. Line bearings were

1. Wkly. Activity Rept. ASA Pacific, 1-7 August 1950.
2. Ibid. 15-21 August 1950.
3. Ibid. 20-27 July 1950.
4. Ibid. 28 July - 3 August 1950.
5. Ibid. 11 - 17 August 1950.
6. Ibid. 18 - 25 August 1950.
7. Ibid. 8 - 14 September 1950.

taken, but in most instances they were inconsistent. Some stations were forced to cease operations periodically due to lack of critical replacement parts. It was not until the latter part of October that an ASA unit was able to establish a D/F net exclusively for North Korean missions.[1]

In late October, several changes in ASA support organization occurred. In Korea, the ASA Liaison Det had been replaced by ASA Pacific (Advance).[2] The 60th Signal Service Company arrived on 16 Oct 1950, established headquarters, and immediately commenced intercept and direction finding operations. In two weeks, the company had set up its first D/F net; one position located near company headquarters at Seoul, the other at Inchon.[3] Twenty Morse positions (19 Korean Communist, 1 Chinese Communist) were initially assigned by ASA Pacific to the company for intercept coverage.

Per NSA

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

Twenty-four hour per day traffic analysis was instituted, but no significant success was achieved due to the complexity of Chinese

1. Wkly. Activity Rept. ASA Pacific, September 1950.
2. Summ. Ann. Rept. ASA Pacific 8621 AAU, FY 1951, Tabs 12 & 13.
3. Monthly Activity Rept. 60 Sig Sv Co, October 1950, P1.
4. Summ. Ann. Rept. ASA Pacific, 8621 AAU, FY 1951, P33.

Communist communications.[1] A Chinese Sub-section of the TA Section was conducting analysis of Chinese traffic from Korea and forwarding its findings to Hq ASA in Washington, where cryptanalytic and linguistic techniques were applied. It was ascertained that only unexploitable types of traffic were being intercepted by ASA facilities in Korea, but suspicion existed that less complicated Ming encipherments were present on lower echelon circuits and an attempt was made at ASA Pacific to isolate and exploit them. Cryptanalysis on the Chinese military problem had not been attempted up to this time.[2]

Analysis of North Korean intercept, however, continued to be successful. Codes used by North Korean ground and air units were broken and translations of intercepted enemy messages disseminated to interested consumers. The effective results obtained in exploiting North Korean communications was attributed in part to the fact that the enemy was using relatively simple cryptographic systems. In fact, there was an almost total lack of security consciousness.[3]

The advantage of having almost one hundred percent (100%) readability in North Korean cryptographic systems permitted scanning of the most valuable types of messages such as situation reports and operational orders. From these, new locations of previously identified units were established, and units not previously noted were identified. This was an indication that the North Koreans were carrying on

1. Summ. Ann. Rept. ASA Pacific, 8621 AAU, fy1951, P43.
2. Study, ASA Pacific, 22 Mar 1954, Subject: KC Problem, P1.
3. Ibid. P4.

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reorganization even while on the run.[1] Especially valuable were numerous messages ordering the withdrawal of certain units, and providing the location of phaselines along which they were to establish their new defenses. Many messages cited areas where "stubborn", "last ditch", and "fight to the death" defenses were to be organized, and listed forces to be used.[2]

Information available from decrypts during this period varied with the amount of traffic sent by North Korean forces. As the United Nations Command offensive progressed, North Korean traffic volume showed a steady decrease. The network underwent structural changes, with stations below Corps echelon disappearing from the air. In turn, Supreme Headquarters took over as net control station, replacing Hq in Seoul. A continual state of flux, mirroring the rapidly deteriorating tactical situation resulted. By the end of October, traffic was negligible, and the net consisted of only two or three main stations which were not observed on a continuous basis.[3]

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1.Rept. ASA Pacific, 22 Mar 1954, Subject: KC Problem, P4.
2. Ibid. P5.
3. Study ASA Pacific, 22 Mar 1954, Subject: KC Problem, P5.

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IV. INTERVENTION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST FORCES TO BEGINNING OF TRUCE NEGOTIATIONS.

Never was the military tactic of being first on the spot with overwhelming forces more thoroughly applied than when the Chinese Communists, on 16 October 1952, rushed across the Yalu River into North Korea with a combat force exceeding 180,000 troops, followed by an additional 120,000 in early November. This force comprised the elite of the Chinese military—the IX Army Group and the XIII Army Group organized into nine armies further divided into thirty infantry divisions. In support of this force, were the 1st and 8th Artillery Divisions.[1]

UN Operations in Korea up to this point had been predicated on the theory that the Chinese Communists would not intervene in behalf of their sorely pressed allies. As a result of this policy, the UN found themselves almost totally unprepared for this new act of agression. In this respect, COMINT agencies in FECOM were little better off than their combat counterparts.[2]

Immediately following the entry of the Chinese Communists into the Korean conflict, Hqs ASA Pacific commenced a further buildup of its existing COMINT facilities. Whereas many mission concentrations continued to be devoted to Russian intercept, these were modified to increase Chinese & North Korean intercept. At the same time, cryptanalytic and linguistic processing of Chinese traffic was initiated. Linguistic personnel were then dispatched to Korea to establish Voice Morse intercept positions.

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1. Rept, ASA Pacific, 22Mar54, Subj: Chinese Communist Problem,(Part 2) P1.
2. Ibid. P2.

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The first team selected on the basis of Army Language School training, arrived 12 December 1950 to accomplish accurate copying and translation of operators' chatter at the intercept site. On 20 December 1950, the second team arrived. Initial site of these intercept positions operated by linguists was at Taegu, with subsequent moves to Yongdungpo, Pyongtaek and Chunchon.[1]

The 60th Sig Sv Co with 20 intercept positions and 4 D/F positions continued to be the only ASA intercept unit in Korea during this period. Its missions were based on increasing success achieved by ASA Pacific and AFSA in exploiting North Korean communications. Because

Per NSA [redacted] (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 missions of the 60th were primarily directed at the intercept and analysis of North Korean Morse communications.

To bolster the company and to provide it further with the capability of performing its mission in support of the tactical forces, ASA Pacific provided technical personnel to man its C/A, T/A, and translation sections, complete and current information on systems, solutions, and recoveries were provided through ASA Pacific (Advance) to the company. This enabled the 60th to analyze its intercept and provide finished translations of intelligence value to the Eighth Army from the first day it went into operation.

By the end of November 1950, the 60th Sig Sv Co was daily producing approximately 30 translations of COMINT value which were forwarded through the SSO to G2, Eighth Army. Translation personnel, however, were unable

1. Rept, ASA Pacific, 22 March 1954, Subj: Chinese Communist Problem, P2.

to keep up with analysts, who were producing solutions almost as quickly as traffic was intercepted, which created three-day backlogs during certain periods. Despite this, every decrypted message was scanned at once and those of current intelligence value translated and passed immediately to the SSO, Eighth Army.[1]

Although the performance of the 60th was satisfactory, and intercepted traffic was reaching ASA Pacific and AFSA by the most rapid means available (daily air courier to ASA Pacific--teletype from there to NSA), there were handicaps. Frequent breakdown of vital equipment was not uncommon. Power units, recorders, and receivers were subjected to harsh treatment while being transported over approximately 750 miles of rough roads and terrain. Frequent and hurried moves and lack of adequate material precluded packing and bracing of receiver positions to insure perfect operating condition at new intercept sites. Attempts to design and fabricate adequate braces were unsuccessful and wire and rope had to be utilized to fasten equipment during moves. Teletype paper essential to providing the required number of copies of intercepted traffic was a short supply item also.

The 60th's D/F operators were more proficient also, but they too encountered operational difficulties for a variety of reasons: frequent moves, inadequate net procedures, old and worn out equipment, and interference on desired targets from other stations. During the UN advance in November 1950, a D/F position was moved from the Haeju area north to Pyongyang. Another was moved from the Seoul area north to Hamhung and a

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1. Statements, Korea translators ASA Pacific and 60th Sig Sv Co, Feb 1954.

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position in the Chunchon area was forced to withdraw on 17 November due to guerilla activity. Other moves took place during December 1950 due to the tactical situation. D/F positions in mid and North Korea were moved to new locations in South Korea. The placement of friendly units presented difficulty in obtaining locations which would provide a suitable base line. This necessitated establishing a D/F position in

Per NSA — (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

[1] to extend the base line.

Not only was the 60th encumbered by breakdown of equipment caused by travel over rough roads, difficulties in locating suitable sites for intercept and direction finding activities, and other local disadvantages, but it was further handicapped by a serious equipment loss caused by a flash fire of undetermined origin which destroyed a radio repair tent, radio receivers, generators, and other vitally needed equipment.[2]

Intelligence of major importance concerning the Chinese Communists in Korea during this period was derived from intercepted North Korean messages. In many cases, this information was so thorough that intelligence agencies were able to reconstruct the complete OB for the Chinese forces in Korea solely from North Korean intercept. The first reference to the Chinese Communists noted in North Korean traffic was in a 10 November message from the 47th Division to the I North Korean Corps. This message stated in part as follows:

> "ENEMY SITUATION: TODAY AT 1500 THE CHINESE PEOPLES' LIBERATION ARMY (CXM). THERE IS NO ENEMY AND IT IS SAID THAT THE ENEMY HAVE WITHDRAWN TO THE AREA OF AN.U. WE DON'T HAVE PRECISE INFORMATION ABOUT THE KAECHON AREA BECAUSE THE KAECHON AREA IS NOT WITHIN THE 55TH UNIT'S SECTOR.."

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1. Monthly Rept, 60th Sig Sv Co, November 1950.
2. Ibid. (December 1950)

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The 55th Unit later proved to be a cover designation for the 39th CCF Army.[1] This type of intercept and Chinese Communist translations, although limited, enabled COMINT agencies to keep tactical intelligence informed concerning Chinese units and their disposition.

Although the major Chinese Communist intercept effort was concentrated on ground units, limited facilities were also provided for intercepting Chinese Air Force traffic. A detachment from the 326th CRC[2] worked on this problem at 5th Air Force Hqs in Seoul, and provided AF, A-2 with much valuable information concerning the Chinese Communist Air Force. One of the messages intercepted contained information of immediate tactical value and it was also a perfect example of the gross mishandling of intelligence derived from COMINT. The message stated that on 30 November 9 TU-2's under KAO YUEH MING would fly from Shengyang West Airfield to Cholsan, Korea, via Antung on a training mission. This information was relayed to the 5th Air Force A-2 who arranged for a reception committee of F-86 Sabre Jets for the Communists bombers. The A-2 carefully planned the mission so that the Communists would not suspect that they had been discovered as a result of COMINT. The mission was successful and several of the Communist planes were destroyed. An AFRS newscast the following day proclaimed that the planes had been destroyed, while taking part in a training mission. The source of the information was immediately obvious to the Chinese; in a short while the particular net on which the original message had been passed disappeared and a valuable source of information was lost to UN intelligence agencies.[3]

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1. Rept, ASA Pacific, 22 Mar 54, Subj: Communist Chinese Problem, Part 2, P2.
2. Ibid. P3.
3. Ibid. P5.

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With the respite offered by the intervention of the Chinese Communist Forces, the North Koreans found time to reorganize and enlarge the so-called "Peoples' Army." This development was disclosed in COMINT material. By mid-November 1950, eight different Corps, numbering I through VIII, had been noted in Korean message traffic. The military network again showed a pattern of expansion, and traffic volume again rose.

At the end of November, T/A had reconstructed the main military network as follows: Supreme Headquarters link with an auxillary Command Post located in Tunghwa, Manchuria, which in turn maintained a net with the newly activated VI, VII and VIII NK Corps. In December, subsequent activity permitted identification of direct radio channels from Supreme Headquarters to the III and V Corps.[1]

During the strong Communist offensive which began on 24 November 1950, and continued through most of December, the North Korean I, II, III, IV and V Corps had tactical missions. Message traffic between these Corps and Supreme Headquarters was mainly of the types seen previously i.e., situation reports and operational orders citing units, locations and activities. Attack orders were observed, giving the area of attack and forces to be used.

Traffic on the Supreme Headquarters and Auxiliary Command Post VI, VII, and VIII Corps nets during this period was mainly concerned with matters pertaining to organization, supply, and training of newly formed units.

In early December, radio links from corps to division began to reappear, and in the middle of the month, further expansion of the network was

1. Rept, ASA Pacific, 22 March 1954, Subj: Korean Communist Problem, P5.

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observed, including the organization of a net concerned exclusively with coastal defense. Late December was marked by identification of a combined headquarters in the military network. This appeared to have served as the forward headquarters of the North Korean military organization.[1]

January 1951 was an eventful month. Organized interception of Chinese spoken digit and Chinese voice morse traffic was initiated by ASA Pacific on 12 January. It was soon apparent that special training was required for operators intercepting Chinese traffic; much time had to be expended in training before an operator could intercept the traffic with adequate proficiency. American soldiers of Chinese ancestry, and Army Language School graduates, were greatly handicapped by dialectical differences on the part of the CCF operators.

On 15 January, a Chinese Cryptanalytic Subsection was organized at ASA Pacific separate from the Korean Section. A Chinese Communist Air Subsection was also established.[2]

During the January general offensive in which the Communists reoccupied Seoul, North Korean radio communications followed the same patterns previously observed with the most valuable COMINT coming from decrypted operational reports passed by the tactical corps to superior headquarters. The I, II, III, and V Corps were quite active on their links with combined headquarters, and toward the end of the month, a link from IV Corps to combined headquarters was observed.

The movement of the North Korean VI, VII, and VIII Corps from Manchuria into Korea was observed in January in both T/A and textual reference in

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1. Rept, ASA Pacific, 22Mar54, Subj: Korean Communist Problem, P6.
2. Ibid. Subj: Chinese Communist Problem, Part I, P1.

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decrypted messages. These corps, which formerly maintained radio links with the Auxiliary Command Post began to work with Supreme Headquarters. More activity on the corps to division level, throughout the network, was identified during this period.[1]

February 1951 found the UN Forces "dug in" along their winter line of defense south of the capitol city of Seoul. At this point, when only

Per NSA — (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 was being intercepted, reports began to filter down from the I and IX US Corps sectors that front line UN units were hearing spoken Chinese radio transmissions. ASA Pacific (Advance) sent an investigating officer to the IX US Corps who reported "a specific requirement for low level intercept is not only present, but is becoming of greater importance." This was especially significant at the time, in view of (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 Consequently, investigation was begun in the field of low level intercept by ASA Pacific (Advance) and Headquarters, ASA Pacific.[2]

Direction finding activity during this period was continually complicated by equipment procurement and utilization problems. Most of those resulted from the nature of the transmissions, difficulty in arranging simultaneous tracking, and distortion caused by terrain features and mineral deposits peculiar to the Korean theater. In February 1952, 16 Homing Devices RC-300, used in conjunction with the SCR-300 radio, were received and put in immediate use by ASA Pacific. Unfortunately, results were far from satisfactory. It was found that even when a bearing could

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1. Rept, ASA Pacific, 22Mar54, Subj: Korean Communist Problem, P6.
2. Rept, ASA Pacific, 22Mar54, Subj: LLI Problem, P1.

be taken, it was of questionable value. Nulls of 40-60 degrees were common at normal D/F targets ranges of one to five miles. Only in a few isolated cases could general areas of units be ascertained. In an attempt to overcome deficiencies of the first tests, experiments were made with modified Cross-U-Adcock antenna in conjunction with the BC-683 radio.[1] Technical results for the most part proved highly successful. In order, however, for these antennae to be effective in the plotting of FM transmissions, they had to be placed either on hill crests or on the tops of intercept bunkers affording enemy artillery forward observers excellent targets or base points for other targets. Thus for tactical reasons, use of such antennae had to be abandoned.[2]

Per NSA

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

1. Rept, ASA Pacific, 22Mar54, Subj: LLI Problem, P5.
2. Ibid. P6.
3. Rept, ASA Pacific, 22Mar54, Subj: Chinese Communist Problem, Part 1, P2.

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Operational procedure at the time involved making tape recordings at the intercept site and forwarding them to the Transcription Section at ASA Pacific for processing and translation. As delivery of the tapes depended upon air transportation, there was an average time lag of four to six days between interception and translation. Longer delays due to inclement weather, such as was prevalent during the latter part of February, were followed by the receipt of enormous amounts of unprocessed tape recordings.[1]

The most significant North Korean development disclosed in COMINT material during March was the emergence of the Railroad Security Division.[2] This organization, located in northeastern Korea, was charged with the mission of railroad defense, but also carried on coastal observation.[3]

At ASA Pacific, 9 enlisted men with special training in Chinese voice transcription arrived on 30 March to eliminate a growing backlog of unprocessed tape recordings. Experiments were undertaken in early April wherein the tapes were both recorded and transcribed at the 60th Sig Sv Co in Korea, and the transcriptions teletyped to ASA Pacific for translation. The outcome of the experiment was that transcribing personnel were shifted from ASA Pacific to the newly formed Transcription Section of the 126th Sig Sv Co, which moved to Korea, in May, to take over complete intercept on the Chinese voice problem. Thereafter, processing and translation kept abreast of intercepted traffic volume. A decision was also made to concentrate all cryptanalytic and linguistic effort at ASA Pacific on voice Morse and spoken digit traffic. All continuous wave (CW) traffic was then subjected only to traffic analysis and passed on to Hqs ASA, in Washington, for cryptanalysis.[4]

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1. Rept, ASA Pacific, 22Mar54, Subj: Chinese Communist Problem, Part 1, P2
2. Ibid. P6.
3. Ibid. P7.
4. Ibid. P2.

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The North Korean problem remained relatively stable during April. Decryptions of enemy messages continued to provide OB information as traffic continually mentioned units, locations, and movements. The inactivation of the VIII Corps became evident from the fact that it had not been observed in communications since February, although both the VI and VII Corps with which it had been associated, continued active.[1] Several

Per NSA

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

The Communist 5th Phase offensive, which occurred in late April and May of 1951 created extensive changes on the North Korean main military network. Combined headquarters was supplemented and then replaced by a North Korean frontline headquarters, which functioned in direct control of the North Korean corps on the line. Key personalities in the new headquarters proved to be the same as those formerly located at combined headquarters.

More important, however, was the fact that the North Korean Army implemented a signal plan for the offensive, far more complex than any used previously. In earlier offensives, units involved had maintained single radio links with their higher headquarters. The 5th Phase offensive found four distinct, parallel nets in use, each with a separate purpose.

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1. Rept, ASA Pacific, 22Mar54, Subj: Korean Communist Problem, P7.
2. Rept, ASA Pacific, 22Mar54, Subj: Chinese Communist Problem, Part I, P2.
3. Ibid. P3.

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These were as follows:

(1) COMMAND--Consisted of separate radio links from frontline headquarters to subordinate I, II, III, and IV Corps. Net passed operations traffic.

(2) INTEGRATED COMMAND--Consisted mainly of frontline headquarters and the III and V Corps, although VII Corps appeared briefly. Net differed from command net in that the corps communicated directly with each other, on lateral radio links, and was designed to facilitate combined operations of the corps involved.

(3) ARTILLERY--Consisted of supreme headquarters, an unidentified artillery headquarters, frontline headquarters and its four subordinate corps. Traffic passed established the fact that it was a distinct, separate net serving only artillery sections at various echelons.

(4) SUPPLY--Consisted of supreme headquarters, frontline headquarters, the III, V and an unidentified corps. Net devoted entirely to supply matters.

Each of these nets functioned in an efficient manner; plain text compromises, operators' chatter and call sign compromises occurred with less frequency than in previous tactical operations. The very complexity of the plan demonstrated that extensive preparations were made for the offensive, ~~Plan~~ and that it might be expected that any future operations would be preceded by similar reorganization of military radio nets.[1]

By 21 May, the enemy offensive had failed with the Communists sustaining heavy losses and UN Forces were once again on the offensive, advancing into North Korean territory. On 5 June, extensive reorganization took place within the Operations Division of ASA Pacific. Whereas, the division had consisted of a Cryptanalysis Section and a Traffic Analysis Section, it was divided into Chinese, Korean and Russian Sections, each of which performed complete C/A and T/A on related traffic.[2]

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1. Rept, ASA Pacific, 22Mar54, Subj: Korean Communist Problem, P8.
2. Rept, ASA Pacific, 22Mar54, Subj: Chinese Communist Problem, Part I, P3.

Although research continued on the feasibility of introducing LLI in the forward areas of Korea, ASA Pacific was confronted with several problems. One of the more important of these concerned procurement of personnel with linguistic ability who could be considered good security risks. It was soon found that it was considerably easier for an intercept operator to intercept his own native tongue and translate into a language he had learned in school than it was to intercept a language learned in school and translate into a native tongue. This precluded the use of Army Language School graduates and American Army personnel of Chinese extraction. The problem could be solved by the contractual hiring of Chinese Nationalists, from either Hong Kong or Formosa, on a Department of Army Civilian (DAC) basis, who, either through schooling in the United States, or through the study of the English language in Chinese colleges or universities, possessed enough knowledge of the English language to cope with the problem. Accordingly, G-2 EUSAK (Rear) at Taegu recruited five DAC's and sent them to the 126th Sig Sv Co (Advance) where preparations were already underway for their schooling and utilization as intercept operators.[1]

In early July, negotiations between the opposing forces were initiated for the purpose of agreeing on a military truce.[2]

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1. Rept, ASA Pacific, 22Mar54, Subj: LLI Problem, Pl.
2. Rept, ASA Pacific, 22Mar54, Subj: Chinese Communist Problem, Part I, P3.

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V. THE STALEMATE - JULY 1951 TO JULY 1953.

Immediately following the opening of truce negotiations, two new North Korean radio links appeared, subsequently identified as between Kaesong, original site of the conference, and Supreme Headquarters in Pyongyang. Readable messages were found to consist of daily operational reports on the front line situation from Supreme Headquarters to NAM Il, Chief of the General Staff of the North Korean Army and Chief North Korean delegate at the conference. One or two messages daily normally summarized a day's activity and discussions, and were sent to Supreme Headquarters. Others were routine, and dealt with supply, personnel, communications and requests for instructions on various points raised. On 25 July, a direct North Korean radio link between Kaesong and Peking came into operation, and the appearance of code traffic was sporadic. In this case, the greater volume of traffic consisted of press and propaganda messages originated by Communist correspondents present at the Kaesong Conferences.

Simultaneous with the opening of truce negotiations, far reaching security changes in North Korean radio communications took place, which seriously affected the output of COMINT from North Korean sources. An indication of this development was noted when a new type of call sign began to appear on the North Korean Military Net. The changeover was ragged at first, and was carried out to an extent approaching completeness only after the truce conferences started.[1] In full effect, the system provided for a call sign change every two days. This was a great improve-

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ment over previous use of the same call signs for long, irregular periods of time. Now, for the first time since the start of the conflict, the North Koreans were using an elaborate, scientific, systematic method of call sign allocation.

Per NSA

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

have been instituted even if there had not been a static situation resulting from the truce negotiations, little doubt was registered that the less critical frontline situation helped facilitate the distribution and speedy

Per NSA

(b)(1),(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

There was also a decline in the relative importance of information obtained from the study of North Korean material as a result of the secondary role played by the North Korean Army following the intervention of the Communist Forces.[1] With the North Korean Army responsible for less

1. Rept. ASA Pacific, 22Mar54, Subj: KC Problem, P9.

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than one-third of the main line of resistance (MLR), it was expected that tactical information of North Korean sources would be considerably reduced in scope. Nearly all major tactical actions which took place subsequent to the commencement of truce negotiations, involved the Chinese Forces with the North Koreans playing little or no part. This static situation permitted installation of landlines to replace the more easily intercepted radio as means of communication. The fact that the North Koreans took advantage of this opportunity and installed landlines in many cases was definitely established during this period.

Even though COMINT production was restricted by these adverse factors, valuable information concerning enemy OB and plans continued to be provided; there were instances where original information not readily available from other sources was furnished. This was particularly true of information concerning enemy activity in rear areas, from which collateral sources were hard-put to obtain timely, accurate information.[1]

On 8 July 1951, the first low level voice intercept team (1-O, 1 EM and 3 DAC's) was dispatched by ASA Pacific to the IX Corps sector for a 24-hour test mission to attempt exploitation of Chinese voice traffic. The only equipment used on this test was the BC-603 radio covering a band spread from 20 to 27 mcs. Although the test had negative results, it provided an excellent basis for further research into the problem of procurement and employment of suitable radio intercept equipment. Following consultation with the EUSAK (Eighth Army) Signal Officer and an investigation into what signal equipment was in the hands of, or available to, the

1. Rept, ASA Pacific, 22Mar54, Subj: KC Problem, P10.

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enemy, BC 683 radio sets were issued to permit resumption of the mission by 13 August 1951.

The initial ASA low level teams utilized a radio jeep as their base of operations with one BC 683. Personnel consisted of 1 ASA Liaison Officer, 1 enlisted man (driver), and 1 radio operator-translator (DAC).

Originally each team reconnoitered a different location daily, always fairly close to the front lines. Teams were reasonably successful in their attempts to intercept traffic passed by enemy battalion and company nets. It shortly became evident that a physical risk was involved in this method of operation, for a vehicle displaying an antenna would sooner or later draw enemy attention and subsequent fire. The ideal solution, which was quickly adopted and remained basic, was the use of a permanent location which would afford the best coverage of enemy nets and, at the same time, afford security for personnel involved.[1] This consisted of an MLR bunker-type position, "dug in" on the reverse slope of a hill. The best position was found to be on a hill facing enemy transmitters, providing interception of uninterrupted line-of-sight transmissions which gave strong, clear, and readable signals.

Progress was slow in the beginning and acknowledgement of successes came almost entirely from the regimental level, whose personnel were the main recipients of this new form of COMINT. Results in the North Korean sector were found to be poor, largely because of the caliber of the translators, who could not readily distinguish between the nets of the North Koreans and those of the South Koreans.[2] Shipments of additional DAC's from Hong Kong and Formosa were delayed for some time pending solution to a question of monetary payment. A DA ruling at the time required that

1. Rept. ASA Pacific, 22Mar54, Subj: LLVI Problem, P1.
2. Ibid. P2.

non-citizens of the US be paid in the currency of the country where they were employed. The official currency of the South Korean Government, however, was not acceptable to the Chinese DAC's. Recruiting was resumed only after the problem was amicably resolved. Meanwhile, the interruption of recruiting necessitated the use of prisoner of war interrogation teams (IPW), which did not prove entirely satisfactory, as these personnel were not always free from their commitments.

Soon after the inception of the low level voice intercept program, a standing operational procedure was developed by the 501st Communications Reconnaissance Group which had arrived in Korea in July, 1951. This document was designed to regulate activities of all existing and future low level teams. G-2 EUSAK also advised its officers and subordinate units with reference to the handling of the intelligence product of the operation and permission to disseminate low level intelligence to command echelons down to regimental level.

From August through November 1951, the composition of most LLI teams consisted of 1 Liaison Officer, 1 to 3 DAC Chinese translator-interpretors in combination with up to 3 Chinese-speaking Korean nationals, 1 EM (MOS 1709), and 1 EM (MOS 1805). Actually, seven ASA teams were formed and located along the I and IX Corps fronts during this period of operations. These were:

*303d CRB

TEAM	UNIT SUPPORTED
1	9th ROKA Div
2	1st US Cav Div
3	25th US Inf Div
4	1st C/W Div

* Arrived Korea, 6 June 1951.

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* 304th CRB

TEAM	UNIT SUPPORTED
A	6th ROKA Div
B	24th US Inf Div
C	2d ROKA Div

Except in the case of the 1st Commonwealth Division, C-rations were furnished for front line use by the supported division. In all cases, messing facilities at base sites were provided by unit command posts with which the teams bivouacked. In the case of teams assigned to Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) Division sectors, such facilities were furnished by the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG). The DAC's were fed and billeted in an officer status. Clothing, equipment, and tentage were obtained from Comm Recon Bns whenever possible, but unavailable minor items were obtained on an unofficial basis by the team liaison officer from the supported division and adjacent units. Wire telephone communications from front line bunkers to base sites were established; equipment for these being procured through "unofficial favors" granted by the division supported. This type of logistic support was common throughout the Korean campaign.[1]

One of the hindrances to the success of the LLI effort that became immediately evident, was the unwarranted practice of UN personnel, both American and ROK troops, of cutting in on the Chinese transmissions in an attempt to engage enemy operators in conversation, or revilement. The enemy's awareness that he was being heard resulted in an immediate rise in the volume of encoded traffic and a general improvement in his COMSEC,

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* Arrived Korea, 2 July 1951.

1. Rept, ASA Pacific, 22Mar54, Subj: LLVI Problem, P3.

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Although specific orders were frequently sent to divisional and regimental commanders prohibiting this practice, it never ceased entirely. This was particularly true in the case of ROKA troops in the IX and X US Corps sectors.

With the arrival of the 301st Communications Reconnaissance Battalion in Korea in the early part of December 1951, a new low level team was attached to the 25th US Inf Div to intercept North Korean traffic. As a technical aid to analytic effort, an IBM Hill Run was completed in January, 1952 listing significant Hills in a strip approximately five miles on both sides of the MLR.[1]

On 15 August 1951, the first field translation team was sent by ASA Pacific to the 126th Sig Sv Co in Korea to perform on-the-spot translation, minimizing delay between intercept time and the time translations reached the consumer. To insure accuracy, translations issued by this team were spot checked by ASA Pacific. In time, more translating personnel were sent to augment this effort at the company (redesignated the 326th Communications Reconnaissance Company (Int) in October, 1951) and the volume of translations increased. To meet this problem, all messages were sent to the IBM Section of ASA Pacific for the preparation of vertical runs equating code with CTC numbers and equivalent meanings in English. This made it possible for personnel with very limited linguistic background, or none at all, to obtain the crux of a message at a glance.

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1. Rept. ASA Pacific, 22Mar54, Subj: History LLVI Problem, P4.

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With the arrival of larger numbers of translators from the Army Language School, the IBM method of decoding messages was dropped, and research on code groups in the proper context of the Chinese Language initiated. By the latter part of December 1951, responsibility for translation had been assumed by the 326th CRC and the function of the Chinese Section became one of furnishing support to ASA units in Korea by isolating, breaking and developing code systems and by training new personnel prior to their assignment.

An important change in the transcribing procedure at the 326th CRC was also effected at this time when a detachment of the unit was established north of Uijongbu with the 25th Inf Div. This resulted in prompt availability of intercepted material to processing personnel, as well as more efficient intercept.[1] By this time, Chinese DAC's recruited from Formosa had come to be utilized for the transcribing of material recorded on tapes. Because of security regulations, recording on tapes was being accomplished in the intercept section of the company, from which Chinese DAC's were excluded, and transcription was being performed by the DAC's in another area, separate from the Intercept Section. This new policy permitted Chinese DAC's to transcribe material directly in the Intercept Section, both listening to intercept in process and having the tapes recorded at the same time to refer to. Not only was the production of transcribed material greatly expedited, but with the DAC's on hand to intercept operator's chatter, it proved possible to maintain more complete intercept without loss due to sudden shifts in frequency, changes in call signs, schedules, etc.

1. Rept. ASA Pacific, 22Mar54, Subj: CC Problem, Part I, P3.

By August 1951, ASA Pacific was charged by AFSA with primary responsibility for traffic analysis on the following targets:

Per NSA

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

Chinese Communist Navigational Air Nets

To fulfill a need for optimum exploitation of Chinese Communist Navigational Air systems which were producing messages of tactical value, ASA Pacific established the "Northern Fox Detachment" in Korea during August, 1951. It was to translate messages right at the intercept site and forward findings directly to 5th AF Headquarters in Korea for intelligence processing.

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

Personnel who comprised the detachment were assigned to the 326th CRC from ASA Pacific and further attached to the Fifth Air Force.

In February 1952, the 6920th Security Group assumed full responsibility for the air net and the detachment. This formed the basis for the eventual transfer of the entire air problem to the 6920th Air Force Security Group effective 11 March 1952. All ASA Pacific personnel assigned to the air problem were then placed on indefinite TDY to render technical assistance.[1] As personnel of the 6920th became familiar with the air problem, men on TDY returned to ASA Pacific in small increments, and by September, 1952, all had returned and were reassigned to other parts of the problem.

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-

Chinese Communist Navigational Air Nets (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403 during this period, were processed, developed and almost fully identified before the processing function was transferred. Translation of these messages simplified traffic analysis, and from (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b) it was possible to reconstruct and locate nets throughout China and Manchuria although the stations themselves were never actually intercepted.[2]

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1. Rept. ASA Pacific, 22Mar54, Subj: CC Problem, Part I, P4.
2. Ibid. P5.

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Chinese Communist Peoples' Volunteer Army

The Chinese Communist Peoples' Volunteer Army net—a manual Morse target—was first (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 In May 1951, the 126th (Adv) moved to Korea and was followed shortly thereafter by the main unit. Eventually, all manual Morse intercept of CCF in Korea was transferred to this company. In June, a reorganization of communications occurred which reduced the number of call signs from 150 to 80, thereby producing a system of schedules and contacts. This was later to allow composite interpretation of the network to reveal the underlying order of battle.[1]

Per NSA

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403, (b)(3):P.L. 86-36

Chinese Communist Voice Nets (Spoken Digit)
Chinese Communist Voice Morse Nets (Artillery Communication)

Voice spoken digits and voice Morse (spoken Morse codes) types of transmission were used for the most part by CCF artillery, armored, and AAA units. Because the traffic passed by these units (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 T/A was not confined to the analysis of message externals to accomplish its main functions of net reconstruction, identification of stations, and maintenance of net and station continuities. Crypto-nets and message content were used to supplement studies of operator chatter, schedules, and signature groups. Crypto-nets were particularly valuable in providing continuity on nets that were inoperative for long periods of time. In fact, several partial or complete nets were reconstructed and identified. T/A was also able to assist

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

East China Military Nets (Third Field Army)

East China Military nets (Third Field Army) were (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403 (b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 on nine positions until 1953, when four were added. Very little actual intelligence was derived from analysis of the East China nets because of the paucity of intercept and this could be classed only as "sampling." It would have been almost impossible to produce intelligence on any of these radio stations unless intercept facilities and efforts had been at least doubled.

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

1. Rept. ASA Pacific, 22Mar54, Subj: CC Problem, Part I, P6.

Per NSA

Peking Kaesong Link

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

The Peking-Kaesong link was copied by one position located in the area of (b)(1) during the period July 1951-September 1952. Traffic was passed in Ming and plain English, containing propaganda releases and personal messages but no intelligence was produced. This link gradually phased out and interception was terminated in favor of Peoples' Volunteer Army communications.[1]

Northeast Military District Nets
(Later identified as Northeast Air Force Administrative Nets)

The Northeast Military District was first covered by (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. and later transferred to (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 It was tentatively identified as the Chinese Communist Northeast Air Force Administrative Network and so redesignated. ASA Pacific continued to process it. Meanwhile, another network in China proper, considered military, was also redesignated Administrative Air and was included in the processing. Analysis resulted in several recoveries at ASA Pacific.

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

Procedures on this network in many ways still resembled Chinese Communist military procedures. Because of a duplication of effort at ASA Pacific and NSA, and the fact that this was an Air Force non-consumer target, NSA relieved ASA Pacific for the responsibility of processing the administrative air network and termination was completed on May 15, 1953.

The front line in Korea was stabilized as the year 1952 began. Activity was at a minimum, consisting mostly of minor patrol actions; many of the cryptosystems being used by artillery units had been broken, and were providing a constant flow of intelligence which, though not of major importance, was serving as a general picture of the enemy situation. At the same time, LLI was proving worthwhile. UN G-2's were able in many cases to utilize intelligence gained through this source both to reduce casualties occurring in UN patrols, and to

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1. Rept. ASA Pacific, 22Mar54, Subj: CC Problem, Part I, P7.

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increase accuracy of fire brought to bear on enemy patrols.

By April, eight ASA low level teams were in operation and their successes were being acknowledged by division and corps commanders. In fact, the Commanding General, I Corps, gratified with the results obtained in his sector, requested that the Commanding General, Eighth Army take action to "increase the ASA effort available at the earliest practicable time."

The overall low level picture, however, was not altogether bright as considerable difficulty still existed in obtaining linguists.[2] DAC's were arriving in small numbers; in many instances amounting only to replacements for those lost because of illness, security considerations, or poor operating efficiency. In one instance, because linguists on a team were incapable of translating directly from Chinese to English, the liaison officer improvised an emergency arrangement whereby "2-stage" translations were made--from Chinese to Japanese, then from Japanese to English--with a loss of valuable time, effort and accuracy. With respect to bad security risks, it was found that DAC's who were procured from Hong Kong were less reliable than those who were recruited from Formosa. It was then decided that all future recruiting would be limited to DAC's from the Chinese nationalist stronghold.

Constant research was performed on radio receivers, and by April all low level teams of the 303d CRB were equipped with SCR-300, BC-683 and the BC-603. At the same time teams of the 304th CRB and one team of the 301st CRB were using both the BC-683 and the BC-603. It was

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1. Rept. ASA Pacific, 22Mar54, Subj: CC Problem, Part I, P8.
2. Rept. ASA Pacific, 22Mar54, Subj: ~~LLVI~~ Problem, P4.

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soon determined that the best equipment for the low level mission was the BC-683 and the SCR-300. While the BC-683 was preferred, its use in a fixed site presented a problem for it was powered with a 12-volt wet-cell battery and continuous operation necessitated re-charging at least once every 24 hours. The batteries were also bulky and hard to handle, and as most of the sites could not be reached by vehicle, there was no recourse but for the men to carry the batteries up and down hills. To overcome this, some teams borrowed PE-210's (battery chargers) which enabled them to perform recharging at team sites. After a few months, the 501st CRG was able to obtain special authorization allowing each team one PE-210. The SCR-300 used a BA-70 dry-cell battery, always in ample supply. Other radios tested included the BC-787, ANG/RC-9, and the BC-603. Although some front line tactical traffic was intercepted on the BC-603, it could not compare with the large volume received over the favored BC-683 and SCR-300.[1]

On 25 April 1952, readjustment of the operational and administrative functions of the 501st CRG with relation to the low level voice intercept effort was effected. All ASA units in support of combat divisions were designated as intelligence sections, or division operating platoons, "to provide a framework on which to increase division support, both in low level intercept and security monitoring." Battalions of the 501st were to continue the exercise of command over intelligence companies as well as assume command, administrative, and operational control of intelligence sections, and division operational platoons.[2]

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1. Rept, ASA Pacific, 22Mar54, Subj: LLVI Problem, P5.
2. OPS O #1, Hq 501st CRG, 25 April 1952.

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Coincident with this development, a low level voice intercept Research Section was organized at the 501st CRG consisting of one OIC, two clerk typists, and three analysts (MOS 1709).[1] It was the responsibility of this section to perform further analysis on traffic received from battalions, with special emphasis on net reconstruction and cryptanalysis of the enemy's low level code and coverword systems. As recoveries were made, they were notated as to the unit using the code and date of use, which proved most valuable in determining movement and relief of enemy units. Except in isolated cases of signal deception, enemy units moving off the line or withdrawing from Korea would take their code books with them, instead of passing them on to relieving units. Monthly reports were published and sent to them (Comm Recon Bns, ASA Pacific and Hq ASA). Captured enemy documents of interest were produced and immediately dispatched to the battalions most likely to be concerned. These documents were also an aid in research on the enemy's code systems, providing insight into his methods of code book construction and coverword application.[2]

By May 1952, 10 ASA low level voice intercept teams were in full operation; with authorization for 80 more DAC's having been approved, plans were made for addition of 9 more teams. The need for them was emphasized by the fact that practically all US divisions in Korea were conducting low level voice intercept programs of their own, utilizing for the most part, idle IPW teams. These efforts, which were coordinating and being supervised by ASA units, along with constant demands

1. Rept. ASA Pacific, 22Mar1954, Subj: LLVI Problem, P6.
2. Ibid. P7.

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TOP SECRET ELINT

of corps and division commanders, pointed up the necessity for rapid expansion of the ASA low level voice intercept program to provide divisions with the support they required.

In July 1952, authority was received from the ACofS, G2, DA, to disseminate Chinese low level voice intercept intelligence to battalion S-2's and division G-2's on a "need-to-know" basis without codeword marking, provided that personnel concerned were cleared for SECRET Security Information. After the material was passed from liaison detachment to Comm Recon Bns at corps level for further processing, the results were marked with a codeword under a SECRET Security Information classification. Dissemination to corps G-2 of codeword information was either given directly to ASA Comm Recon Bn at corps, to the corps G-2 or through the SSO at corps to the corps G-2. The choice in each case was based on convenience. This new policy allowed for greater latitude of action and more rapid transmittal of COMINT to those who had an immediate "need-to-know."[1]

With the passing of the first year of operations, the low level effort became confronted with the loss of personnel due to DA and ASA Korean theater rotation policies. Under the former, ASA personnel serving in areas to the rear of divisions were earning 2 points a month, at divisions or further forward, 3 points a month, and in front line bunkers, 4 points a month. Forty points were needed to return to the ZI. Under the latter policy, a man could rotate out of the Korean theater into another ASA post in the Pacific theater if he had served six or more months in Korea and had

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1. Rept. ASA Pacific, 22Mar54, Subj: LLVI Problem, P8.

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a replacement. The problem arose of replacing losses due to rotation with qualified personnel. It became clear that valuable time was being lost in training men at the intercept site, but facilities for training elsewhere in Korea were non-existent. Virtually no instruction along this line was being given at the ASATC, from which new personnel were being received. In view of the need, a low level indoctrination course was instituted at ASA Pacific on 21 July 1952 for the benefit of newly arrived ASA personnel destined for shipment to Korea. This course was not intended to cover all the many intricate and unique factors involved in the low level operation, which could be learned in the field. It did, however, familiarize new operational personnel with the purpose and general working of the program.[1]

Ground action during the late summer months of 1952 was relatively slight, consisting almost entirely of small enemy probes and the usual patrol actions. Chinese Communist stations of what were felt to be high level Chinese units, such as armies and army groups, had developed into a complex and meaningless network. Thousands of man hours were spent by ASA units in exploitation, but nothing concrete was accomplished.

Finally, on 8 August 1952, intercept of a plain text message provided an almost complete solution.[2] From collateral information concerning various branch headquarters of Chinese Communist Forces, two of which were identified, it was soon possible to establish tentative identity for three more and the armies they served. Following this, it became a simple matter to report movement of an army within Korea, or into or out of

1. Rept. ASA Pacific, 22Mar54, Subj: LLVI Problem, P6.
2. Ibid. Subj: CC Problem, Part II, P4.

Per NSA

Korea, based on a change in or cessation of radio contact with a brandh headquarters.[1] By late September, ASA units were (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 being transmitted over voice radio communication circuits in Korea.

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798.(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

The period 1 July to 1 October 1952 was also a period of fruition for the low level voice intercept effort. Additional teams were established, activities of the Analysis and Processing Section of the 501st CRG were stepped up, and policy broadened for the dissemination of material derived from low level voice intercept sources.[2]

By 1 October, 15 LLI teams, including one test team of the 304th CRB, were in operation. By battalion they were:

301st	-	2 teams
303d	-	8 teams
304th	-	4 teams (plus 1 test team)

An approved supplementary list of equipment contributed to the fact that those teams were better equipped than their predecessors. Teams of the 301st CRB had 63% Ordnance, 41% QM, and 80% Signal equipment at the time of committment. Those of the 303d CRB had 78% Ordnance, 46.5% QM, and 76% Signal equipment, and teams of the 304th had 80% Ordnance, 36.9% QM, and 73.2% Signal.[3]

Another significant development during this period was the increased proficiency with which ASA units were able to provide higher echelons with strong indications of major enemy actions. Such was the case of WHITE HORSE MOUNTAIN, undoubtedly the classic example of ASA support to an army in the field.

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1. Rept. ASA Pacific, 22Mar54, Subj: CC Problem, Part II, P5.
2. Ibid. Subj: LLVI Problem, P8.
3. Ibid. P9.

An intercepted high level Chinese Communist military message, followed by analysis, provided the first clue that this large scale enemy attack was being planned. One misleading factor, however, was that the majority of Chinese Communist units (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 by ASA were artillery units. Definite indication would normally have been evident through requests for large amounts of ammunition and movement of artillery pieces, but a survey of translations for the period 1 September to 1 October 1952, disclosed no unusual activity of this type underway. Yet, it was these seemingly normal shipments, thought to be for current use by the 1st Artillery Division, 21st Artillery Division (Katyusha) and the 7th Artillery Division, that permitted the gradual build-up of ammunition stocks in preparation for reinforced attack.

Per NSA

On 1 October 1952, a message transmitted by an unidentified tank regiment confirmed the contemplated attack. It was interpreted as indicating that an action was to take place either on the day of the message or in the immediate future.[1] Details were complete to the point the tank regiment was to provide artillery support.

At 1700 hours on 2 October the message was hand carried to the SSO, EUSAK to determine if enemy action had been initiated. No unusual enemy activity occurred during the night of 1 October and up to 2000 hours, 2 October. This immediately led to the conclusion that a large scale enemy operation was to be carried out in the immediate future. The possibility that additional details of this impending action would be transmitted by (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 required great speed in processing future translations.

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1. Rept. ASA Pacific, 22Mar54, Subj: CC Problem, Part II, P5.

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Accordingly, (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 (1-0, 3 EM) was dispatched from the 501st CRG to operate at the intercept site of the 329th CRC.[1] Teletype facilities were made available for the transmission to Group Hq of all translations having a bearing on the operation. (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 the bulk of Chinese traffic was performed at Hq 501st CRG.[2] Although the team at the 329th CRC had OB information available, the OB Section at group was also placed on 24-hour alert to process incoming translations, thereby giving commanders a more detailed analysis of intercept. Through this coordinated effort, translations were completely processed from the intercept site at the company, through OB, then to SSO, EUSAK in less than four (4) hours after intercept.

Per NSA

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

Within hours after (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 commenced operation, vital information needed by UN commanders came. In a message dated 3 October 1952, the date, time, objective, and units to be employed during the attack were disclosed. On 4 October 1952, the exact hour was again mentioned in a message.[3] This corroborated information given by a CCF deserter apprehended three days prior to the attack. The PW disclosed that his unit, the 340th Regiment, 114th Division had received pre-attack training for a period of four weeks; that the attack would take place between the 4th and 5th of October 1952. He also revealed that considerable artillery had moved into the area to support the attack on Hill 395 which would be further supported by many tanks.

As the time for the attack drew near, additional details became available from translated messages. These indicated that under the cover

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1. Rept. ASA Pacific, 22Mar54, Subj: CC Problem, Part II, P6.
2. Ibid. P7.
3. Ibid. P8.

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of an artillery barrage, troops of the 114th Division, 38th CCF Army were to cross the main line of departure to the assualt line of departure. Upon the signal from division for the main attack to start, the artillery barrage would be lifted, permitting troops to advance upon their objective. The artillery barrage was to be coordinated among elemsnts of the 113th Division Artillery, 114th Division Artillery, an unknown tank regiment, 202d Artillery Regiment (Katyusha) and elements of the 1st Artillery Division. Messages translated on 3 October further indicated that the enemy was to employ tanks to support the 610th Regiment and follow the infantry up two hills in direct support and possibly fight off any UN counter-attack.

In another translated message, it was disclosed that elements of the 116th Division, 39th CCF Army, in support of the 114th Division along the western flank, were to launch attacks against UN troops to their immediate front.[1] The attacks occurred but on a lesser scale than was stated. In fact, there were fifteen probes and attacks initiated by the enemy during the period 3-7 October.

Phase two of the battle of WHITE HORSE MOUNTAIN concerned traffic intercepted by LLI teams from 1-14 October 1952. Each team was located on high ground in bunkers near the scene of the actual fighting. The teams operated 24 hours a day, employing DAC's of Chinese nationality, to intercept enemy voice transmissions by means of radios ranging in frequency from 20 mcs to 54 mcs.

It is interesting to note that little or no advance indication of the enemy's intention to attack was found in intercepted messages of the low level teams. The only abnormality which would tend to indicate any CCF

1. Rept. ASA Pacific, 22Mar54, Subj: CC Problem, Part II, P9.

movement was the increased number of messages sent, but no direct mention of an attack was intercepted.

An extenuating factor in studying the maximum effect of this radio intercept and the results obtained, is that the attack occurred in a Republic of Korea Division sector.[1] In this particular situation, information relayed to ROK unit commanders was first processed through KMAG for evaluation and dissemination.

In contrast, most artillery units in the sector were manned by US personnel, thus enabling ASA units to pass valuable tactical material directly to artillery unit S-2's for immediate action. Evaluation and dissemination of tactical intelligence data, in this case, were consequently more efficient.

From 1 to 5 October, all low level traffic intercepted pertained to communication checks and zeroing of artillery pieces. On 3 October, the day preceding the original attack date, interdepted traffic volume increased, then decreased the next day. Another increase occurred on 5 October, the day prior to the actual attack. This indicated that some type of activity was going to take place; however, there was no definite indication of what it was or where it would happen. Later during this same day, a message was transmitted indicating that no action would take place.[2]

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1. Rept. ASA Pacific, 22Mar54, Subj: CC Problem, Part II, P10.
2. Ibid. P11.

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To illustrate correlation between information obtained from ASA low level voice intercept and verified intelligence, highlights of the WHITE HORSE MOUNTAIN (Hill 395) action which took place during the period 6 October, the day of the attack, until 14 October, follow:[1]

6 October

Low-level voice intercept reports cited specifically, through exact traffic quotations, that launching of the CCF attack on Hill 395 would be signalled by the transmitted message "East Wind" initiating an artillery preparation at 1930 hours.

1830 hours--Signal "East Wind" intercepted.

Note:

Eighth Army PIR reported 8048 rounds of mixed artillery fell in 9th ROK Division sector. This was interpreted as pre-attack artillery preparations and fire in support of the initial assualt.

1940 hours--Message ordering a reservoir bridge destroyed at the southern terminal of the Pangnae-Ho Reservoir intercepted and passed to KMAG - G-2, 9th ROK. The purpose was to flood the YOKKOK River to such an extent as to isolate WHITE HORSE MOUNTAIN, and prevent reinforcements from reaching the fighting area during the early stages of the action. The flood gates were actually opened, but the expected flood did not materialize as the water level rose only an average of 25 feet. At no time during the action did the increased water level present a major tactical obstacle to the UN forces.

1945 hours--Intercepted traffic relayed to S-2's and KMAG, G-2 advisor by ASA teams reported CCF infantry assault which later development into a full-scale attack--this was reported by Eighth Army PIR as beginning at 2040 hours at two positions.

Note:

Estimated size of attacking units was five companies to more than two battalions. This was based on the fact that CCF units used the triangle system, i.e., three companies per battalion, three battalions per regiment, etc., and a system of numbers to identify the companies. It was assumed from intercept that

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1. Rept. ASA Pacific, 22Mar54, Subj: "CC Problem, Part 2, Pll.

Eighth Army PIR, confirmed by intercept, estimated enemy reinforcements of battalion strength was effected at 2100 hours.

Note:

While the battle of WHITE HORSE MOUNTAIN was in progress, information was sent from the Intelligence Officer, COMNAVFE, to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Hq FECOM, concerning Chinese voice transmissions being heard on the SCR-300 by UN forces stationed on Yodo island in Wonsan Harbor. It was suggested that an ASA low level intercept team be sent to survey the situation in the hope that intelligence derived from intercept there would be transmitted directly to naval units operating in the immediate area. Such information would help afford maximum protection to naval aircraft, at the time being harrassed by Communist MIG's, and in turn render enemy aircraft more vulnerable to UN counterattack.

10 October

At 0135 hours, UN troops had secured the crest and were holding and consolidating their gains. The enemy attacked again, however, at 0800, employing two battalions, and UN troops were forced from the crest.[1] The UN counterattacked at 1140 hours, and after again seizing the crest moved beyond it about 300 yards. Another enemy attack supported by heavy mortar and artillery fire, was launched at 1815 hours. This pene- penetrateds the UN lines again, forcing a withdrawal to a position 200 yards south of the crest. Once again, the UN attacked, this time at 1930 hours, with two battalions and advanced slowy throughout the night.

The fact that friendly troops were attacking from three directions was intercepted at about the time of the final UN attack of the day. Most intercepted traffic, however, concerned artillery firing and adjustments. There was, however, one message which indicated that a new unit was to be committed by the CCF. This was confirmed by Eighth Army PIR which stated that the 1st Bn, 335th Regiment was committed during the period 1124-1224. Further, enemy casualties were reported as 519 estimated KIA, 1,108 estimated WIA, and 16 POW's.

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1. Rept. ASA Pacific, 22Mar54, Subj: CC Problem, Part II, P16

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On 10 October, a low level voice intercept team was dispatched by ASA Pacific consisting of 1-O, 2EM (one traffic analyst and one radio maintenance specialist) and three DAC's along with the following equipment: 3-SCR-300, 1 BC-603, 1 BC-683, and 1 AN/GRC-9). All four radios were used continually for 14 hours the first four days and approximately 10 hours the last three days. Results obtained were far from encouraging for the intercepted CCF transmissions emanated from nets associated with CCF armies that were being amply covered by low level sites on the main peninsula. It was believed that the voice broadcasts reported by the Navy were "freak transmissions"; OB at that time indicated that only North Korean forces were stationed in the immediate Wonsan area.[1]

11 October

UN began action at 0430 in support of friendly action on WHITE HORSE MOUNTAIN by firing at the crest and other strong points from positions on the MLR. Meanwhile, the two UN Bns continued their advance and by 0700 hours had secured the crest. The enemy fell back from the fighting area, but was instructed to search UN bodies and also to attempt to find wounded UN personnel southeast of the mountain.[2]

Intercepted message alerted CCF troops for a possible UN attack at 1215 hours.

Note:

(Here, CCF troops used "H" time rather than "I" time as used by UN forces. Consequently, they remained one hour behind the time used by UN forces.)

UN attack occurred and enemy traffic indicated heavy casualties were sustained by the CCF. As the attack pressed on, 50 UN troops reached a new position only to be forced back by heavy artillery and mortar fire.

Intercepted traffic stated later that a reinforced Bn was going to counterattack. At 1620, forces consisting of a company and six squads attacked and forced UN troops to withdraw to a position 50 yards below the crest. The attack was halted and the enemy was subsequently forced to withdraw, apparently due to the lack of artillery support and small arms ammunition. UN troops held their position throughout the remainder of the night.

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1. Rept. ASA Pacific, 22Mar54, Subj: LLI Problem, P11
2. Rept. ASA Pacific, 22Mar54, Subj: CC Problem, Part II, P17.

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1. Rept. ASA Pacific, 22Mar54, Subj: LLI Problem, P11
2. Rept. ASA Pacific, 22Mar54, Subj: CC Problem, Part II, P17.

Eighth Army PIR reports stated that UN artillery was directed numerous times throughout the day and inflicted heavy casualties. Through interception of several messages, it appeared that the UN counter-battery fire was very effective, as one artillery bn had only seven pieces left from an original twelve.[1]

12 October:

Limited radio transmissions occurred in the combat area. There were hazy indications from intercepted traffic that UN forces might attack again. At 0800 UN forces launched an attack, which encountered stiff resistance. At noon, the crest was regained. Fighting continued, however, for control until 1330 hours. By 1500 hours, enemy resistance had weakened and UN troops had secured the crest.

Intercept of enemy messages at 1240 hours revealed that UN forces were in possession of 6 out of 9 positions. Intercept at 0235 hours indicated that the CCF were shooting UN POW's captured on WHITE HORSE MOUNTAIN.

13 October:

See-saw battle on WHITE HORSE MOUNTAIN continued with UN troops slowly regaining the upper hand and retaking terrain previously lost. On a hill immediately west of the mountain, UN troops were forced to retire, suffering heavy losses. Although the CCF had a reinforced Bn, they requested more troops and artillery support.[2]

Intercepted traffic indicated a heavy toll of casualties among the CCF dug in on the North slope of WHITE HORSE MOUNTAIN, disclosed information about reinforcements and determination of CCF commanders to hold their positions, and referred to the killing of UN POW's.

14 October:

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Sporadic action continued throughout the early morning hours when a UN Bn, by a hardhitting attack, wiped out two enemy platoons in an initial assualt.

1. Rept. ASA Pacific, 22Mar54, Subj: CC Problem, Part II, P18.
2. Ibid. P19.

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Traffic intercepted later during the day indicated complete and utter defeat of the CCF troops in their attempt to capture WHITE HORSE MOUNTAIN. Confusion and the large number of casualties among the CCF commanders and troops, plus the continuous UN counterattacks and artillery left the CCF soldier with only the hope of remaining alive.[1] An urgent plea for replacements and reinforcements was also noted. Although the CCF were still in control of small positions of Hill 395, UN counterattacks and heavy artillery barrages forced the enemy to abandon the hill completely the next day.[2]

Statistics quoted from an Eighth Army PIR concerning enemy casualties during the battle of Hill 395 reflected 3,244 CCF troops KIA, total casualties of 12,112, and 39,002 artillery rounds fired in the 9th ROK sector. Casualties suffered by the CCF represented a loss of eight full Bns during the period 6-14 October.

Through the capture of CCF POWs, eleven Bns from five enemy regiments were identified. Order of committment of these units follows:

1st, 2d, 3d Bn	340th Regt.
2d Bn	334th Regt.
2d, 3d, Bn	342nd Regt.
1st Bn	335th Regt.
2d, 3d, Bn	335th Regt.
2d, 3d Bn	336th Regt.

It is readily evident that low level voice intercept played a definite role in the battle of WHITE HORSE MOUNTAIN. Though this medium was inadequate to present conclusive evidence affording an analyst opportunity to predict actual initiation of the attack as did high level, its own function was soon obvious. Information of immediate tactical intelligence value was distributed to field commanders, and a "blow by blow" account of the battle was constructed through this unique insight. Clear understanding of the roles of high level and low level intercept in the

1. Rept. ASA Pacific, 22Mar54, Subj: CC Problem, Part II, P20.
2. Ibid. P21

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battle of WHITE HORSE MOUNTAIN also demonstrated without question, the value of providing field commanders with on-the-spot tactical intelligence.[1]

Landline intercept--closely related to low level voice intercept--originated on or about 25 September 1952. The US 25th Inf Div commenced initial phases at an area known as Sandbag Castle in the X US Corps Sector.[2] A sound-powered microphone used in conjunction with a sound detecting device (SDD-3) normally used to indicate the approach of enemy troops, began to "pick-up" enemy telephone conversations. This incident was described in the 25th Division PIR's as a "phenomenon". Though this source of information was used by the troops involved, no attempt was made to clarify the theory, and the activity was passed on the US 40th Inf Div when it relieved the 25th on the line.

The 40th, upon assuming responsibility for the initial land-line circuit, attempted to improve upon it by (1) use of a ground stake, (2) burying the wires, and (3) using a sound-powered landset, T-10 as a pickup device. These changes improved the circuit. Little, if any, effort was made by division personnel to analyse the traffic intercepted.[3] Only information passed in the clear was utilized.

Information culled from the conventional means of radio intercept and from POW reports showed that the majority of North Korean Forces facing the X US Corps employed the ground-return landline principle.

When the new potential for COMINT became clearly visualized, ASA stepped into the picture. In November 1952, the ASA Liaison Officer at Division Headquarters was notified of the landline development, and compre-

1. Rept. ASA Pacific, 22Mar54, Subj: CC Problem, Part II, P11.
2. Rept. ASA Pacific, 22 Mar54, Subj: LLVI Problem, P11.
3. Ibid. P12.

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hensive experimentation was undertaken. On 10 December, the 301st CRB assumed control of the operation.[1]

Initial stages were periods of trial and error. In an attempt to overcome the problem of fading signals, the intercept site was moved from a position some 1400 yards back of the MLR to a location forward of the MLR, only 35 yards away from the nearest enemy position. In further attempts to improve reception and broaden the coverage, tests were made with various methods of intercept over a period of three months. Although all components of the approved circuit were within friendly lines, the danger of casualties but not of capture, was recognized as being substantially increased. With due regard to such risks, the resolve was made to keep the intercept in this exposed position as indispensable to success. Subsequent developments justified this resolve.

Cryptanalysis activity developed consistently at ASA Pacific during early 1953. Additional functions of the C/A Section included identification of incoming traffic as to code systems or category of non-readable traffic, and analysis of non-readable systems.[2] Policy was broadened to train each individual through rotation of duties.

The Research Section of ASA Pacific consisted of 1 WOJG, 16 EM, AND [redacted] & 4 DAC's, all of whom were linguistically trained. DAC's, who had worked on the CC Problem since its inception, acted as consultants. Each person was assigned to work with one or more specific code system as it was advantageous to have the analyst become thoroughly familiar with one system, rather than be only generally familiar with all systems. Whenever possible, one or more experienced research linguists and several trainees were

1. Rept. ASA Pacific, 22Mar54, Subj: LLVI Problem, P12.
2. Study, ASA Pacific, 22Mar54, Subj: CC Problem, Part I, P8.

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assigned to each system, so that efforts of newly assigned personnel might be under constant supervision, and their training enhanced by association with experienced technicians. This sub-section lent assistance to the cryptanalytic sub-section in its efforts to make initial entry into new systems, then developed the recovery of the systems to a stage of readability where the 501st CRG could assume responsibility for current translation. Research was also continued on unrecovered code groups as long as a system remained in existence. Translations were limited to backlog traffic and reissues of occasional 501st CRG translations discovered to be incorrect.

The Traffic Analysis Sub-Section consisted of 1-O and 20 EM who were processing the various Chinese targets charged to ASA Pacific.

The Chinese Section continued to increase in specialization, both in problems and duties. Whereas, the section had originally concerned itself with all types of traffic,ie., air, voice, and continuous wave (high echelon), the principal concentration was now focused on the Chinese voice problem. This was possible in view of personnel increase and the fact that air traffic was transferred to the Air Force, and CW (high echelon) was turned over to NSA. It was also possible for C/A men to devote time to specific phases of research, and for linguists to concentrate on specific code systems.

As knowledge of CCF communications methods and procedures had improved, a considerable number of research documents were written from compromised enemy material. Training of inexperienced cryptanalysts and linguists was intensified, during the period September 1952 to June 1953.[1] Seventy men of

1. Study, ASA Pacific, 22Mar54, Subj: CC Problem, Part I, P9.

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both categories were trained by ASA Pacific.

Traffic analysis techniques were so thoroughly developed that it was now possible to identify all Chinese armies in Korea, and most artillery divisions. Exploitation of numerous artillery nets, and increased proficiency of low level voice intercept enabled prediction of vicious limited-objective attacks launched by the enemy. Many of these included the exact time, date, objectives and a good estimate of the number of enemy troops involved.[1]

Landline intercept--the newest ASA technique--was progressing. Following improved working conditions and several months' experience, the program was regarded as successful and considerable praise had been expressed by consumers, particularly as this form of intercepted traffic was of tactical value to frontline troops in the vicinity of the point of intercept, as well as Division and Corps G-2's. In many instances tactical information culled from this source abetted that which was intercepted over radio. Information concerning enemy patrol activity, casualty reports, strength and supply reports and problems, enemy artillery and mortar actions, observation reports, and results and evaluations of UN artillery and air strikes was transmitted many hours before radio intercept could be correlated with the action, however, experience clearly established the fact that landline intercept was profitable only in areas with certain features and terrain, and only when two opposing lines were in close proximity to each other.[2]

In early May 1953, tests for a new landline intercept site were conducted in the Heartbreak Ridge sector on the X Corps front, utilizing the AN/PTA-1 (XC-1), a new sounding device. This equipment proved superior

1. Study, ASA Pacific, 22Mar54, Subj: CC Problem, Part II, P23.
2. Ibid, Subj: LLVI Problem, P11.

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to sounding device (SDD-3) in its capability of detecting ground-return landline circuits, and giving intelligence information from the intercept of such circuits. As a result, the second ASA site for this activity was established.[1]

In many ways, the organization of a landline intercept site and a low level voice intercept was the same. It consisted of four American enlisted men and three Korean or Chinese translators, under the control of the ASA LnO division headquarters. The position was manned 24 hours a day, with at least one enlisted operator and one translator on duty at all times. The translator copied all traffic received and immediately called the attention of the enlisted men to any traffic of possible intelligence value. When the volume of traffic was abnormally high, two translators were put on duty, one to copy the traffic and the other to do translating. Tactical information derived from intercept was passed to the local Infantry Battalion S-2. All information of immediate interest was then relayed from the battalion to the regiment S-2, who in turn, notified the other infantry battalions and the division G-2.[2] Information was also passed to the ASA Liaison Officer of the CRB. Corps G-2 received the information from this latter source. Traffic was removed one time a day from the intercept site and taken to the base camp at division headquarters where it was processed along with traffic from other low level voice intercept positions.

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1. Study, ASA Pacific, 22Mar54, Subj: LLI Problem, P11.
2. Ibid. P12.

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The low level voice intercept effort continued to function efficiently. From 1 January - 1 July 1953, new intercept equipment was added, and larger increments of personnel arrived. The number of teams in full operation across the 155 mile Eighth Army front increased from eighteen (18) at the turn of the fiscal year to twenty-two (22) at the close of hostilities. These included two (2) ground-return landline intercept sites located in the X Corps Sector. The distribution of liaison detachments, low level voice intercept teams, positions and DAC's, by CRB's in the months February to July 1953 follows:

	301st CRB						303d CRB						304th CRB					
	F	M	A	M	J	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	F	M	A	M	J	J
Ln Det	3	3	3	3	3	3	5	5	5	5	4	4	3	3	3	3	3	3
LLVI Teams	4	4	4	5	5	3	9	10	10	10	10	5	6	6	7	6	7	5
Positions	7	7	7	8	8	6	18	20	20	20	20	10	17	16	18	21	15	15
DAC's	6	6	6	6	5	5	53	51	52	53	52	43	45	41	40	38	37	34

Throughout this period, COMINT derived from low level voice intercept continued to be of great value to division, regimental, and battalion commanders, as witnessed by the abundance of after-action reports and letters of commendation issued to both individuals and teams for their efforts.[1] While the information culled from the enemy's radio transmissions was still primarily of on-the-spot value to UN forces, being passed directly to division G-2's and Regimental S-2's, there were many times when, through analysis of enemy communication patterns, a large area or sector was determined to be critical by the communications reconnaissance battalion commander three or four days prior to a forthcoming action.[2]

1. Study, ASA Pacific, 22Mar54, Subj: LLVI Problem, Pl2.
2. Ibid. Pl3.

With the signing of the truce on 27 July 1953, some North Korean radio nets identified in the frontline areas disappeared, but overall traffic volume increased considerably. Messages passed by units in the rear areas which mentioned the truce called for greater vigilance and alertness because they emphasized the fact that the truce did not mean peace. Considerable redeployment of North Korean radio nets was also noted. North Korean forces reoccupied islands above the 38th parallel which had been held by the UN, reorganization of the AAA department of the Artillery Command took place, and movements of AAA and Armored units were observed. Also noted was a movement of major elements of North Korean I Corps from an east coast area to the Kaesong area.

The opening of truce negotiations, with the breathing spell which accompanied it, was an occasion for the enemy to effect great improvement in his transmission

Per NSA (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

than previously. Despite this condition, COMINT was proving extremely valuable, and much of the information derived from it could not have been obtained from any other source.[1] Meanwhile, low level voice intercept teams concerned themselves with the enemy's preparations for withdrawal from the line of demarcation.[2]

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1. Study, ASA Pacific, 22Mar54, Subj: KC Problem, P15.
2. Study, ASA Pacific, 22Mar54, Subj: LLI Problem, P17.

VI. THE AFTERMATH - AUGUST—DECEMBER 1953.

With the close of the active phase of the Korean conflict, plans were made by FECOM for deployment of all major US combat forces from Korea. To allow staff sections of Hq ASA Pacific and the CO, 501st CRG to plan deployment of ASA units concurrently, policy was announced to the effect that certain COMINT units and limited security activities in support of residual forces in Korea (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 would be phased out.

Per NSA

When the X US Corps (Gp) ceased command functions to serve as a military advisory group to the First ROK Army (Field), one COMINT unit (Hq & Hq Det-CRB) was immediately declared surplus to Korean requirements. Because of a possibility that this unit might be required (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 at cadre strength on a 72-hour readiness basis.

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P

COMSEC support requirements were decreased with the withdrawal of two US Divisions from Korea.[1] This resulted in a proposal to deactivate or reduce to zero strength the 351st CRC (Scty), but this was not favorably considered.[2]

Within the structural framework of Hq ASA Pacific, a gradual change in COMINT operations occurred. In the Intelligence Branch, more and more stress was placed on Traffic Analysis as the (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 decreased. This led to a dispersion of OB and intelligence report writing personnel to nationality sections. Under this arrangement, report writers and intelligence analysts were co-located with case analysts and raw material.[3] Another significant change occurred in the operation of manual Morse which at this time totaled 123½ positions. Through assignment and utilization of school-trained operators, an increase of 82% in manual Morse positions took place while increasing manual Morse intercept personnel 25%.

1. SAR, Hq ASA Pacific, 8621 AAU, FY 1954, P50.
2. Ibid. P50, 51
3. Ibid. P56.

Per NSA

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403, (b)(3):P.L. 86-36

Although the Intelligence Branch began this period with a (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798, (b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 Section, the world scarcity of (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 and the inherent difficulty of the language made it advisable to centralize this activity in Washington. In August 1953, the section was closed. Linguists were returned to NSA, Traffic Analysis personnel were assigned to FS 8609, and the balance of the section was absorbed within the Chinese, Korean, Russian and Administrative Sections of the Branch.[1]

Within the Chinese Section, the cessation of hostilities made possible a reduction in the number of personnel needed to process voice Morse material. In turn, assumption of complete responsibility for the Peoples' Volunteer Army (PVA) traffic analysis problem necessitated expansion in the Traffic Analysis Sub-section.

The paramount concern of this section throughout the period immediately following the cease-fire was processing material derived from intercept of four problems, namely: Peoples' Volunteer Army (North Korea and Manchuria intercept), Third Field Army (East China intercept), North China, and Voice Morse (North Korea intercept), A resume of progress follows:

Peoples' Volunteer Army

As of 1 August 1953, the Peoples' Volunteer Army was being exploited by five analysts, Because of the limited number of analysts assigned, the development of unknown call signs and any long term research was extremely difficult.[2] Efforts therefore, were concentrated on the movements and locations of armies, which was of deep interest to all intelligence consumers. With decreased activity on other problems, notably Voice Morse, PVA traffic analysis became the main source of COMINT concerning the CCF, in Korea

1. SAR, Hq ASA Pacific, 8621 AAU, FY 1954, P51.
2. Ibid. P65.

SECRET

Intercept positions were assigned during this period according to the relative value of intelligence missions requiring such positions. Following the cease-fire, all PVA traffic was intercepted on 29 positions. This was to be gradually increased. In addition, new identifications through both COMINT and collateral sources, development of unknown nets, and an increased number of available analysts were combined, to produce a much more complete analysis effort on the PVA problem than was formerly possible.[1]

Third Field Army

OB information collected through research played an important part in the development of this problem although the number of identified cases rose following the end of hostilities, call signs did not increase, for many permanent cases were renotated from former temporary cases. Chinese Morse intercept positions were gradually increased and this resulted in added processing.[2]

North China

Per NSA

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

In October 1953, a special search and development project was added. Its mission was to develop all military links in North China not exhibiting

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

Nets in this area apparently associated

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 4

but which did not generate in accordance with

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

were included. In November the project was successful in discovering and exploiting the

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403, (b)(3):P.L. 86-36

which was tentatively identified as part of the net serving anti-aircraft units

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

1. SAR, Hq ASA Pacific, 8621 AAU, FY 1954, P66.
2. Ibid. P69.
3. Ibid. P70.

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Voice Morse (North Korea Intercept)

The Voice Morse problem deteriorated rapidly following the cease-fire. One analyst was retained on the problem, whose task consisted largely of routine processing of six or seven remaining active nets. Within the Cryptanalysis Research Sub-Section, monthly traffic volumes had been consistently high before the signing of the armistice. However, following the cease-fire, message totals decreased 70%. The section capitalized on this period of comparative lull to engage in various forms of research which heretofore had been suspended. Several technical aids were compiled, a dictionary of compounds frequently found in military traffic was prepared, and several tape recordings suitable for training Voice operators, were made.[1]

As previously mentioned, the Chinese Communist forces in Korea increased their offensive efforts with a series of limited objective attacks during June 1953. At this time there were 19 non-organic artillery regiments present on the front line. Previously (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 Per NSA systems used by these units began to reappear with minor variations. In most cases these were solved immediately. With the cessation of hostilities, intelligence gained from these communications continued. A summary of the post cease-fire period follows:

Per NSA

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

1. SAR, Hq ASA Pacific, 8621 AAU, FY 1954, P74.

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The overall drop in traffic affected training of translators for it had previously been the practice to carry out on-the-job training with current traffic. With little or no "live" traffic to exploit, it became necessary to establish within the Chinese Section a training unit in the Cryptanalysis Research Sub-section to accomodate a steady flow of translators from the ZI. Those who had completed basic training in Ming and simple translations in Washington were immediately advanced to a course in book breaking. Others were tested for linguistic aptitude for either straight translation work or breaking code.[1] As the number of translators was too large to be absorbed in the voice Morse problem by either ASA Pacific Hqs or the 501st CRG, a decision was made to assign the surplus

Per NSA

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

language.[2]

Prior to cease-fire in Korea, the Korean Section provided close technical support to the 501st CRG in the field. Cryptanalytic research on all cryptographic systems passed on North Korean (KC) military and internal government nets was continuous. All (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 was processed for possible exploitation and for further identification according to homogenous characteristics or type, such as military operational, political security, railroad security, and guerilla.[3]

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

processed on a 24-hour schedule. With the signing of the armistice and

1. (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36
2. Ibid. P83.
3. Ibid. P87.
4. Ibid. P85.

an easing in the political situation, NSA assumed full responsibility for processing all (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 traffic during August. Hq, ASA Pacific, was limited to the mission of processing all (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798 and any plain language traffic and of scanning all (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 traffic.

The major traffic analysis effort on the North Korean problem was carried out at the 501st. The primary traffic analysis functions on the (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 were carried out at the 501st CRG and the 327th CRG until the mission was consolidated at the latter station. Until 19 July 501st CRG, (on traffic received from ROK Group M and Flight A, 15th Royal Signals Munster (RSM)) and 330th CRC. On the same date, technical sections from the latter unit were merged with corresponding sections at the 501st CRG. This was necessary in order to effect maximum utilization of limited technical personnel.

1

Per NSA

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

Per NSA

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

Post-Korean activities of the Russian Section were devoted to the Russian Far Eastern Military Communications system. Technical support was provided to intercept stations engaged in Russian intercept to assist them in locating, obtaining, and identifying added material. Concurrently, an effort was made to derive additional intelligence, either technical in nature or of the "end product" intelligence type, for authorized consumers.[3]

Per NSA

1. (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36
2. Ibid. P89.
3. Ibid. P92.

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

Per NSA

The joint teletype net, a three station loop, connecting the control stations of the Army, Air Force, and Navy D/F nets was located (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 respectively. This net was used for the passing of operational traffic relative to joint D/F operations.

The Pacific D/F net flashed approximately 4,343 missions a month during July, August, and September, 1953. A return of 34,599 bearings per month, from which about 862 fixes a month were obtained, was experienced during this three month period. In October, flash stations were instructed to concentrate on out-stations. This resulted in a drop to approximately 3,492 missions, 9703 bearings, and 337 fixes a month from October on. This drop, although apparently excessive, was justified as 93 control stations and 80 out-stations were accurately located and identified. These were made readily usable to analysis sections.[1]

1. (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

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(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

Radio direction finding was on a flash plotting basis throughout the period following the cease-fire. Fixes were forwarded with target data and bearings by reports. In September 1953, a consolidatation of bearings was limited to those targets whose identities could be traced through one or more call sign changes.[1] JOVE cryptosystem (AFSAG 1244, with slight modifications) was employed for the encipherment of flash missions. A special cryptosystem, employing a grill and special alphabet lists was used for the encipherment of tracking data, instead of AFSAG 1245 system, which was impracticable. COMUS cryptosystems was tested by the D/F net in September, 1953, (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 As the COMUS cryptosystem proved to be superior to other existing systems, it was adopted for joint use. DIANA cryptosystem was issued to the D/F net in September 1953 to facilitate the encipherment of operational and prodedural messages.[2]

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 was altered as a result of the cease-fire. The group COMINT Branch was divided into five general sections viz: Chinese Communist (CC), North Korean (NK), (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403, (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 Integration, and Direction Finding. The latter section directly supported the Chinese and North Korean Sections which were made up of groups of personnel devoted to traffic analysis, cryptanalysis, and translation. The Integration Section (including North Korean and Chinese OB personnel) served as a receiving and consolidating agency for COMINT produced by the North Korean and Chinese Sections and for information received through collateral sources.

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1. SAR, Hq ASA Pacific, 8621 AAU, FY 1954, P58.
2. Ibid. P59.

TOP SECRET

Per NSA

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

TOP SECRET ~~ELINT~~

Although this organization produced good results, experience began to reveal that activities encompassed by the Integration Section tended to hinder efficient and timely operation. For this reason, the section was dissolved and its personnel assigned to the North Korean and Chinese Sections.[1] In turn, these major sections were reorganized into single units which assumed responsibility for the preparation of intelligence reports for all consumers as well as technical reports for intra-agency dissemination. The Integration Section was replaced by a COMINT officer who supervised and co-ordinated the activities of the entire COMINT branch and directly controlled low level voice activity for both problems.

Whereas intelligence reporting to consumers during the course of hostilities was maintained on a daily basis, this was replaced a weekly intelligence summary together with both spot and informal reports to the Special Security Officer (SSO) on matters of immediate importance.[2]

Achievements of the various reorganized sections during the after-action period follows:

North Korean Problem

In general, paramount missions of the North Korean section following the cease-fire were those concerned with North Korean military, naval, and guerilla activity, (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 was removed from the 501st and transferred elsewhere (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 which automatically increased emphasis on the North Korean cases.

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

1. Ann Rept., (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36
2. Ibid. P30.
3. Ibid. P31.

~~ELINT~~

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET ... EIDER

Per NSA

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

Chinese Problem

Per NSA

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

Traffic analysis personnel developed a coherent and accurate intelligence picture during this period and continued to report movements of large enemy units within and out of Korea. The Eighth US Army, and higher echelon

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403, (b)(3):P.L. 86-36

1. Ann Rept.,
2. Ibid. P33.
3. Ibid. P35.

TOP SECRET ... EIDER

Per NSA

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

units of ASA were provided with a constant flow of information which increased, not only in volume and accuracy, but also in its importance to the UN effort.

On 1 July 1953, continuity was being maintained on approximately 45 active manual Morse nets. This number gradually increased to 65 high echelon type nets which provided information at division level or higher. Although the traffic (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 the Chinese Communist Section was able to derive considerable intelligence from these nets through analysis of message externals.[1]

In general, intelligence derived from intercept after the signing of the truce acquired an even greater importance to all consumers. Prior to the signing of the truce, (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798, (b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 was available and often proved to be of tremendous value to the UN effort. Following the truce, however, this source of intelligence was seriously curtailed due to the disappearance of many of the low echelon radio nets. Agency reports had also been an important source of intelligence, but these became few in number and often too vague to be of importance. The lack of POW reports was an additional factor which left COMINT as one of the most important and reliable sources of information about the enemy in North Korea. Intelligence derived from manual Morse copy, therefore proved to be of prime importance in the determination of strength, distribution, and movement of Chinese Communists in North Korea.[2]

Throughout this period, the (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 received the bulk of its intercepted traffic from (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798, (b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 From three sites, a total of 30 positions monitored Chinese Voice communications. Raw traffic was processed through a central traffic control center.[3]

1. (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36
2. Ibid. P38.
3. Ibid. P40.

Per NSA

At that point cryptanalysis personnel rapidly scanned the traffic to determine its value and the proper precedence that should be given to it. This insured rapid distribution of critical messages not only to ASA sources, but to the consumer as well.

The abrupt decline in voice communications which followed the cease-fire resulted in extensive search (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 manual Morse traffic by (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 Only eight positions were considered necessary to provide adequate coverage on voice transmissions. The remaining positions intercepted large amounts of manual Morse,[1] (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

1. Ann Rept., (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

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(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

Per NSA

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

2. Ibid. P43.
3. Ibid. P46.

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Per NSA

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

2. Ibid. P48.

Per NSA

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

Direction Finding

The cessation of hostilities necessitated a continuing dependence upon the D/F product and resulted in extensive efforts to increase its effectiveness. This was approached from anumber of angles. First, there was realization of the need for revision of the baseline, then reorientation of D/F antennas, followed by emphasis on maintenance and repair of equipment, revision of procedures for net control, and finally, revamping of the evaluation principles of results obtained.[3]

On 1 July 1953, the Korean D/F net consisted of one flash circuit using multiple flash procedure, and one report circuit using standard communications procedures. These two circuits were retained following the

1. Ann Rept., (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 Per NSA
2. Ibid. P52.
3. Ibid. P53.
4. [illegible]

cease-fire and net procedures changed to multiple flash. Along with this change came net construction which involved installation of keying lines between tip-off stations of the 326th and 330th CRC's.[1]

In November 1953, JOVE cryptosystem was put in effect[1] (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 flash circuit, and the simplicity of page and line designators made enciphering and deciphering easier.

The COMUS system was also tested, and was recommended as a replacement for the JOVE system on the basis of its superiority in speed, brevity of messages, and combinations of tracking and reporting data on a single page.

Per NSA

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

Throughout the period, D/F transmission lines caused some trouble because no impedance matching instruments were available[3] (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 4 for balancing cables. Shunt resistors were difficult to find and even more difficult to match up. These last items, along with shortages of other critical items of D/F equipment, caused the majority of the problems.

The moving of D/F control to group headquarters following the cease-fire was undoubtedly the greatest single factor in improving coordination and control of the D/F net.[4]

With the assumption of control of the First Republic of Korea Army over the X US Corps sector, operational aspects of the 301st CRB changed considerably. This is best reflected in the following deployment as of 1 July 1953. At this time, the battalion was supporting the X Corps in active

1. (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 Per NSA
2. Ibid. P55.
3. Ibid. P57.
4. Ibid. P58.

combat operations ainst the North Korean and Chine[illegible] Communist Forces.

UNIT	LOCATION	UNIT SUPPORTED
Headquarters & Headquarters Detachment (Operations)	DT 199084 Kwandae-Ri	Tenth United States Corps
Liaison Detachment #1	DT 078295	20th & 7th Republic of Korea Divisions dissemination made to G2 Advisor, KMAG.
USM 661-01	DT 043400 Hill 1220	
Liaison Detachment #2	DT 141269	40th & 45th United States Inf Divs
USM 661-02	DT 183401 Sandbag Castle	
USM 661-03	DT 201387 Inchon Hill	
USM 661-05	DT 142402 Heartbreak Ridge	
Liaison Detachment #3	DT 364308	40th US & 12 ROK Inf Divs. Dissemination made to G2 Advisor, KMAG.
USM 661-04	DT 365488 Hill 751	

This disposition continued until the truce was signed. During this period, USM 661-01, 03, and 04 were engaged in intercepting North Korean and Chinese Communist Forces radio communications, while USM 661-02 and 05 were intercepting North Korean landline communications. On 14 July USM 661-05 became a test team, conducting tests in vicinity of Hill 1090, DT 053413, but this operation was discontinued and the team deactivated. During the final phase of active combat, COMINT supplied to the supported units continued to be useful and contributed in blocking the final push by the enemy just prior to the truce.

Per NSA (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

Beginning on 28 July, USM 661-02 and 03 were closed out and on the following

1. (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

TOP SECRET

day USM 661-01 and 04 were closed out.[1]

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

Concurrent with ROK Divisions replacing US Divisions on the line, plans were formulated for the deployment of three ROK Army Corps to control the ROK Divisions while the X US Corps became a Corps Group. In conjunction with this plan, a Ln Det was to be attached to the KMAG of each ROK Corps to support the G-2 Advisors. On 21 Sep 1953 this plan was put into effect with the establishment of a new Liaison Det #1, less intercept team, being attached to II ROK Corps at CT 835-210. The former Ln Det #1 was redesignated Ln Det #2, supporting III ROK Corps, and Ln Det #3 was attached to I ROK Corps. The attachment of Ln Det #3 necessitated moving the Det and

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 respectively. On 18 Oct 53

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

On 8 Nov 53 the battalion moved from its previous location adjacent to the 330th CRC (Int) to the area vacated by the 330th upon its deployment. Operationally the battalion was not affected by the move, as it consisted of moving from tents into permanent type buildings.[3]

The 303d CRB—in its 30th month of service in Korea—was located in the I US Corps Compound at Uijongbu prior to the cease-fire. Its mission

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 I US Corps and combat infantry divisions comprising the Corps. Following the end of hostilities, operations began to decline progressively.[4] Hq & Hq Det was

1. (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36
2. Ibid. P37.
3. Ibid. P38.
4. Ibid. P31.

moved to a new area, 100 yards away on the perimeter of the I US Corps Compound.[1] ~~Liaison~~ Liaison Detachment #1, was operating a forward operations section (designated Liaison Det #2 and 3 teams 04, 05, 06) in support of the 1st Marine Div which had just relieved the 25th Inf Div on 12 July 1953.[2] (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 forced the closing of team 04 on 2 August. Team 05 was closed on the same date, reopened briefly on 16 August, and finally deactivated on 30 August. Team 06 was shifted from location to an area

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

Per NSA

in the distance. To facilitate administration of Detachment #2, its operation was transferred back to base-site and ceased to exist as a separate unit.[3]

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

Detachment #4, entered this period with 3 teams (01, 08, 10) and, as was the case with the other units, found it necessary to shift and close teams at the beginning of the cease-fire. Two teams, 08 and 10, were deactivated on 2 August. (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 In view of its location in a ROKA Div, Det #4 experienced the greatest difficulty of all units of the battalion in obtaining logistic support. To improve these conditions without interrupting the operational effort, it was decided to amalgamate this detachment with the 1st Commonwealth Division.[4]

1. (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36
2. Ibid. P33.
3. Ibid. P36.
4. Ibid. P38.

Elements of the CCF artillery located the US 7th Inf Div CP in July 1953 and began to shell it accurately. Det #5, located near the Div Command Post also came under bombardment and a shell all but destroyed a squad tent. Fortunately, there were no casualties. On 15 July, the base site was moved to a less vulnerable location. Teams 07 and 02 were [1]

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

Shortly thereafter, the US 25th Inf Div rotated with the US 7th Inf Div and Det #5 set up liaison with the new division. The 7th Div came back on line 7 months later and liaison was re-established. At this time, the 25th Div acting as Corps blocking Div, requested that ASA units still supply

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

Per NSA

With the signing of the armistice (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 of the battalion decreased sharply (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36 Although certain orders concerning the CCF's fulfillment of the armistice agreement terms were heard, the anticipated decline began one day later when tactical radios were removed from the Demilitarized Zone and greater reliance was placed on landline communication. Once the withdrawal had taken place, the

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

Observations of UN aerial and ground activity, particularly in the CHUNGSHAN-NI sector, and occasional tactical infantry and artillery maneuvers continued to be heard, but not in great volume. When the Eighth Army began abandoning the main line of resistance, and constructing new main battle positions, (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L assumed the sur-

1. (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36
2. Ibid. P39.

veillance mission.

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

When it became obvious that the interrogations of North Korean and Chinese Communist POW's were developing into a psychological defeat for the Communist Forces, they began to report the exact numbers of South Korean and Chinese who desired or rejected repatriation. They also reported on the effectiveness of their psychological warfare broadcasts to their men held in South Korean compounds. These, incidently, were the only occasions on which the CCF and NK Forces made direct radio contact with the UN Forces. Representatives of each nation were stationed at both transmitting and receiving sites and Chinese and Korean were spoken alternately, necessitating the use of both Chinese DACs and Korean CMS (Critical Military Specialist) personnel

Per NSA

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

At the conclusion of the explanation period the site was discontinued, but the numeral designation, team O2, remained open for future special assignments of this nature.

One other unusual development during the post-armistice period of relative inactivity was the appearance of what is familiarly known as the

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

1. (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36
2. Ibid. P55.

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

In addition to the unusual number of stations involved, and the fact that the net was heard by all battalions across the Eighth Army front, the extraordinary range for frequency modulation radios was highly irregular.[1] The exact mission of the CCF station involved was never fully determined because of the strictly routine nature of the traffic, but the possibility that this was a one-time CCF check of point to point communication across their front was indicated several times. Little more than reconstruction of the CCF net diagram was accomplished at battalion level, but it provided an excellent traffic analysis exercise for all those working in operations at the time.

Per NSA

Along with routine preparation of the daily intelligence summary, occasionally containing evidence of CCF violations of the Demilitarized Zone, the battalion also prepared several special reports at the request of Gp Hqs and I US Corps G-2. After the cessation of hostilities, certain personnel who were familiar with the wartime LLVI operations were requested to prepare a handbook of specific case studies on actions with which they were familiar, and in which LLVI played a prominent role, presumably for the training of future analysts in this field. This brochure was prepared and forwarded through ASA channels. At a later date, a special study on CCF low level radio net continuity from wartime to post-armistice operations was written at the request of the I US Corps G-2. This study revealed that little continuity existed, and that only one net definitely maintained its callsigns and contacts substantially intact throughout the post-armistice

1. (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

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Per NSA

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

The foregoing delineates the picture of the deployment and activity of participating ASA COMINT units following the Korean war. An evaluation of each cycle of ASA COMINT operations prior to, during, and immediately follow-

Per NSA

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

1.

2. Ibid. P22.

3. (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

ing hostilities clearly demonstrates that the agency contributed notably to the overall effectiveness of COMINT and accomplished its missions in support of the UN effort to avoid open warfare in the Far East. Lessons learned in Korea still serve today as a guide to COMINT operations. It is certain beyond doubt that the agency today is better manned, equipped and prepared to meet future crises such as Korea than at any other time in its history.

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25 Apr 52 The Solar CA [illegible] to have land landing gear at the LLV entry Panel [illegible] as found at the Solar.

Jul 52 Des G2, DA LLV could be distributed to Ballon S-2's & G2's division on need to know basis

May 53 Tests for area landing interrogator device AN/PYA-1 (XC-1) power supply

27 July 53 Change in thermistor value weight of NK nets.

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APPENDIX A

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS IN THE KOREAN CONFLICT

FY 1951

INITIAL PHASE TO AFFORD MAXIMUM SUPPORT TO MAJOR TACTICAL UNITS IN KOREA

25 Jun 50	SIGROD cryptographic equipment destroyed at Seoul by State Dept personnel in view of communist advances.
30 Jun 50	SIGROD cryptographic equipment destroyed at Suwon by KMAG.
1 Jul 50	ROK Group "M" organized by South Koreans to intercept and process North Korean military traffic.
11 Aug 50	SIGROD cryptographic equipment destroyed at Pohang by Eighth Army. Recovery of this equipment showed incomplete destruction by MlAl incendiary.
25 Aug 50	50th SSD alerted for movement to Korea.
1 Sep 50	60th SSD reorganized for movement to Korea.
4 Sep 50	ASA Pacific Ln Det (Prov) activated.
18 Sep 50	ASA Pacific Ln Det arrived in Korea. Provided support to ROK Group "M".
25 Sep 50	35~~1st~~ 20 CRC activated in ZI at Camp Richeth.
25 Sep 50	303d CRB activated in ZI.
25 Sep 50	50th SSD personnel arrived in Korea.
26 Sep 50	ASA Pacific Ln Det and 50th SSC (det) personnel coordinated as ASA Pacific Adv.
28 Sep 50	Assessment 8468th Comm Recon Bn & ordered to active duty 304th CRB activated in ZI.
28 Sep 50	ASA Pacific Ln Det temporarily organized as ASA Pacific Adv.
2 Oct 50	50th SSD arrived in Pusan attached to 8th Army and 2d Log. Com. Operated from Taegu.
9 Oct 50	60th SSC arrived Pusan from Seattle.

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000096

12 Oct 50	50th SSD moved to Seoul.
15 Oct 50	50th SSD became operational in Korea.
15 Oct 50	60th SSC became operational in Korea.
16 Oct 50	60th SSC arrived Seoul attached to 8th Army.
18 Oct 50	501st CRG activated in ZI at Camp Pickett
20 Oct 50	301st CRB activated in ZI.
Nov 50	Adv element 60th SSC established cryptocenter (field) in Pyongyang.
Nov 50	Two SIGROD's destroyed with M1A1 incendiary by 2d Div, 8th Army. Not recovered.
1 Nov 50	329th CRC activated ZI.
14 Nov 50	ASA Pacific Ln Det deactivated. Replaced by ASA Pacific Adv.
20 Nov 50	303d CRB arrived Camp Stoneman POE.
25 Nov 50	303d CRB departed San Francisco
26 Nov 50	ASA Pacific Advance activated.
Dec 50	60th SSC withdrew to Taegu.
9 Dec 50	303d CRB arrived Yokohama.
12 Dec 50	Flash fire destroyed 60th SSC maintenance tent, 7 Super-Pro receivers burned beyond repair.
20 Dec 50	Advance party 303d departed Tokyo for Korea.
21 Dec 50	50th SSD moved to Taegu.

3590 arrived in Korea

PHASE 2, PROCUREMENT OF ADDITIONAL SUPPORT FOR UNITS IN KOREA AND FOR TACTICAL RESERVE ELEMENTS IN JAPAN.

8 Jan 51	303d CRB departed Yokohama for Pusan.
10 Jan 51	303d CRB arrived Pusan.

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21 Jan 51 — 303d CRB departed Pusan for Taegu by motor convoy.

Feb 51 — 303d CRB organized liaison teams per TOE 32-500.

Mar 51 — Operational teletype line installed 60th SSC to 8th US Army (Main).

Spring 51 — Blanket authority granted by DA to move CRC(I), CRC(S), and CRB to Korea.

PHASE 3, PLANS FOR POST-TREATY, POST KOREA DISPOSITION OF UNITS THROUGHOUT FECOM.

Apr 51 — Adv element of 60th Comm Ctr moved to Yongdungpo for 2 wks then withdrew to Pyongtaek. 3 wks later back to Taegu.

24 Apr 51 — 50th SSD departed Korea for Japan.

26 Apr 51 — 50th SSD arrived Japan.

May 51 — All ASA units alerted for movement from Taegu to Seoul in view of UN advances.

8 May 51 — One-half 126th SSC shipped to Korea. Other half remained in Japan. Transcription Section to take over complete intercept on Chinese voice problem.

29 May 51 — ~~304th~~ 8th CRB redesignated as 304th CRB departed ZI for FECOM.

Jun 51 — 60th SSC Comm Ctr moved to Seoul.

6 Jun 51 — 303d CRB completed movement to Seoul.

8 Jun 51 — 501st CRG departed ZI for Japan.

27 Jun 51 — 304th CRB arrived Korea. Attached to 8th Army with Hqs in Inchon.

29? 27 June 51 — 126th SSC became gonhead

FY 1952

1 Jul 51 — 126th SSC moved to site of IX Corps Main near Chunchon.

2 Jul 51 — 304th CRB landed Inchon and moved to Seoul.

10 Jul 51 — 330th CRC assigned to 501st CRG.

12 Jul 51 — 326th CRC placed under 304th CRB; commenced operations.

12 Jul 51 — 304th CRB placed on TDY with IX Corps.

15 Jul 51 — 304th CRB moved to Chunchon; assigned 501st CRG.

501st CRG arrived in Korea in early July

iii

last wk Jul	Main body 126th SSC severed connection with FS 8610 and moved to staging area near Kyoto.
31 Jul 51	Mbl Rad monitoring team 501st CRG assigned to monitor POW broadcasts.
Aug 51	Initiation of LLI.
5 Aug 51	304th CRB relieved attachment 8th Army, attached IX Corps.
6 Aug 51	303d CRB relieved attachment EUSAK, attached I Corps for logistic and administrative support.
10 Aug 51	Some personnel exchanged by 303d CRB and 352d CRC.
12 Aug 51	501st CRG formed detachment Northern Fox to translate messages at intercept sites.
14 Aug 51	4 dets 303d CRB attached I Corp's Divs for logistic and Court Martial support.
15 Aug 51	Advance element for 501st crypto-linguist team arrived in Korea. Sent by ASAPAC to 126th in Korea to perform the Sport Translation.
21 Aug 51	304th CRB assigned Ln O to 24th and 7th Divs.
25 Aug 51	330th CRC team dispatched to X Corps to select new radio intercept site.
30 Aug 51	126th SSC left Sasebo for Pusan.
13 Sep 51	Entire 126th SSC reunited in Korea.
14 Sep 51	352d CRC began low level (b)(1), (b) voice monitoring.
21 Sep 51	501st CRG Comm Ctr began operations.
22 Sep 51	330th CRC Comm Ctr moved from Seoul to X Corps area.
23 Sep 51	330th CRC operated 8 positions at Kwandae-Ri and 9 in Seoul.
25 Sep 51	330th CRC T/A section moved to X Corps area.
26 Sep 51	330th CRC moved from Seoul to site of X Corps; attached to X Corps for logistic and court martial support.
late Sep	Additional 501st CRG C/A personnel arrived in Korea.
Oct 51	Work initiated on devices for LLI. Preliminary SOP for LLI prepared by 501st CRG and distributed to CRBs and Liaison teams.

Per NSA

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798, (b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

000099

25 Oct 51	60th SSC redesignated 330th CRC.
25 Oct 51	51st SSD redesignated 356th CRC.
25 Oct 51	50th SSD redesignated 851st CRD.
25 Oct 51	126th SSC redesignated 326th CRC.
25 Oct 51	304th CRB reorganized.
last wk Oct	Advance party 329th CRC to Fort Mason.
31 Oct 51	329th CRC personnel readiness date for shipment to FECOM.
31 Oct 51	7 ILI teams established on I and IX Corps fronts.
1 Nov 51	329th CRC operational equipment left Camp Pickett.
8 Nov 51	Advance party 329th CRC arrived Hqs ASA Pacific.
9 Nov 51	329th CRC equipment arrived Camp Stoneman POE.
13 Nov 51	329th personnel arrived Camp Stoneman POE.
20 Nov 51	329th CRC sailed from Camp Stoneman.
2 Dec 51	329th CRC arrived Yokohama.
2 Dec 51	301st CRB arrived FECOM; assigned ASA Pacific.
3 Dec 51	301st CRB arrived Korea; assigned 501st CRG.
10 Dec 51	301st CRB assigned X Corps for logistic and court martial jurisdiction.
14 Dec 51	Four North Korean guerilla prisoners with previous experience in COMINT interrogated.
21 Dec 51	330th CRC assigned to 501st CRG.
21 Dec 51	329th CRC assigned to 304th CRB.
21 Dec 51	330th CRC D/F Det #3 assigned to 301st CRB for administrative supervision.
23 Dec 51	329th CRC arrived at Inchon.
30 Dec 51	301st CRB became operational in cryptologic support X Corps.

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Jan 52	New concept of "ASA in support of a field army" operations developed, TOE recommended and operating procedure for Div operating platoons announced.
3 Jan 52	329th CRC began operations.
6 Jan 52	329th CRC began tactical operations from 20 positions.
6 Jan 52	501st CRG assumed responsibility for 330th CRC D/F.
10 Jan 52	326th CRC set up 2 D/F teams near Chipori and Chunchon.
11 Jan 52	329th CRC started LLI.
17 Jan 52	329th CRC established 3 LLI teams.
17 Jan 52	329th CRC established 1st voice Morse intercept site near Sabangori.
18 Jan 52	329th CRC began operation of Morse site at Sabangori.
26 Jan 52	330th CRC transferred 3 positions to Kansong.
7 Feb 52	First D/F tip off position established at Chunchon.
23 Feb 52	352d CRC received transfer of Mbl Rad section.
Apr-Jun 52	Test of Div operating platoons began.
5 Apr 52	304th CRB operated 3 LLI teams on IX Corps front.
7 Apr 52	329th CRC voice Morse moved to Chipori.
22 Apr 52	304th CRB moved to new location near Chipori.
25 Apr 52	501st CRG placed LLI teams on DS to Bns.
30 Apr 52	330th CRC awarded Meritorious Unit Commendation, for period 9 Oct 50 - 1 Sep 51.
May 52	352 CRC undertook low level monitoring of 7th Div.
May 52	330th CRC established intercept school.
May 52	326th CRC assumed responsibility for all CW transmission in mission change.
May 52	304th CRB initiated 4th LLI site.
3 May 52	329th CRC dropped tactical effort.

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000101

3 May 52	329th CRC took charge of D/F station at Yonchon from 501st CRG
5 May 52	T/A and C/A personnel placed on DS with 501st CRG.
5 May 52	329th CRC moved to juncture of Kumwha and Chorwon valleys.
7 May 52	304th CRB assumed control of X Corps LLI.
11 May 52	329th CRC assumed responsibility for voice Morse intercept, in both I and IX Corps.
12 May 52	329th CRC placed 16 voice Morse intercept positions in operation at Songjong.
14 May 52	326th CRC transcription and translation sections became operative.
15 May 52	329th CRC completed 10 positions at Yonchon intercept site.
15 May 52	2nd D/F tip off position placed in operation at Yonchon.
24 May 52	501st CRG submitted SLOE for LLI teams.
late May 52	303d CRB assumed final T/A of subordinate reports.
Jun 52	2d Prov Scty monitoring section established in X Corps.
3 Jun 52	330th T/A personnel from 501st CRG, returned to the company.
4 Jun 52	329th CRC established 3d D/F team near Haska.
end Jun 52	10 LLI teams established along 8th Army front.

FY 1953

Jul 52	Liaison team #2, 301st CRB established in Punch Bowl area.
Jul 52	Det #4, 303d CRB assigned to support 3d Div.
Jul 52	501st CRG established 19th LLI team.
Aug 52	329th CRC advance D/F tip off position moved to Uijamgbo.
mid Aug 52	Critical items for LLI teams arrived in Korea.
Sep 52	Det #4, 303 CRB assigned to support 1st ROKA Div.
18 Sep 52	304th CRB moved to Sinpo-ri near IX Corps.
Oct 52	301st CRB installed new site on Hill 751.

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000102

Oct 52	501st CRG received interim approval for issue of equipment to ROK Group "M".
Oct 52	Det "D" 330th CRC moved to new site ½ mile north of Kansong.
Oct 52	Advance D/F tip off position of329th CRC moved from Uijamgbo due to interference with intercept positions.
12 Oct 52	Liaison team #3, 301st CRB commenced operations.
Nov 52	330th CRC assigned traffic analysts to Kansong for duty as liaison men at intercept site.
Nov 52	D/F site of 329th CRC moved from Kumwha to Maksa-ri.
3 Nov 52	D/F site of 330th CRC moved from Chunchon to Punch Bowl area.
Dec 52	501st CRG Comm Ctr assumed relay responsibility for 326th, 329th, and 330th CRCs.
8 Dec 52	Third D/F site of 330th CRC formed and placed between two established sites.
10 Dec 52	301st CRB assumed responsibility for landline intercept.
29 Dec 52	Det #5, 303d CRB assigned in support of 7th Div.
Jan 53	Drop in intercept traffic reported by 501st CRG Comm Ctr.
10 Feb 53	329th CRC instituted a multiple flash system for RDF operations.
Mar 53	329th CRC established intercept test site at Sujon-ni.
Apr 53	330th CRC started courier runs to dets.
11 Apr 53	Det, 330th CRC sent to 1st Marine Div for special mission.
May 53	Dets #1 & 2 of the 303d CRB merged to provide support to the 25th Div.
May 53	New type receivers for radio intercept received by 501st CRG.
2 May 53	Second landline site established by 301st CRB.
Jun 53	D/F site, 329th CRC moved from Yonchon to Uijamgbo.
22 Jun 53	501st CRG assumed control of Group D/F control from 326th CRG.
30 Jun 53	501st CRG operated 21 LLI teams.

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APPENDIX B

CHRONOLOGY OF COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE

YEAR	MONTH	EVENT
Per NSA (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36		
1951	October	Intercepted messages V North Korean Corps indicated that 36th Div was to be deactivated and personnel incorporated into the 6th, 32d and 12th Divs of V Corps.
1951	November	Per NSA (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36
		Intercepted message of 82d Regt, 8th Div, NKPA, performing guard duty in Kaesong area. Announced forthcoming attack by two divisions in Kaesong area with push to be made as far south as Imjin River.
1952	January	Intercepted traffic of 23d Brigade net disclosed plans for amphibious attacks against UN-held islands off North Korean coast. Similar information intercepted from traffic on 21st Brigade net which replaced 23rd in Hwangae province of North Korea.
Per NSA (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36		

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1952	February	Information developed through traffic analysis showing reorganization and redistribution of units in the North Korean V and VII Corps. Transfer of the 46th Division and 25th Brigade from VII Corps to V Corps detected when those units stopped operating on their links with VII Corps and were identified on new links to V Corps. Reorganization of North Korean railroad Security units also detected.
1952	March	North Korean Armored Command - a long range COMINT study - first observed. Net structure unstable due to reorganization. Important traffic indicated build-up taking place with delivery of tanks and self-propelled guns to Korea from Manchuria.

Per NSA

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

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1952	June	North Korean Artillery Command Net (A long range COMINT study) Net discovered when 21st and 23d AAA Regiments were noted moving from Pyongyang, where all AAA Regiments had apparently been located, to the E coast. Intercepted traffic detected other independent regiments and bns being organized and deployed.
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		NK Armored Command becoming more stabilized. T/A determined organization of a number of independent armored regiments controlled by a hqs on an Army level. This differed from previous information concerning NK armor organizations as most had been reported as being contained in the 17th and 105th Divisions, subordinate to IV Corps. A total of ten regiments were either identified as stations on the new armor command net, or mentioned in traffic. Locations for nearly all of these regiments were established. Two were located in E coast areas with elements of the V and VII NK Corps. Remaining were located in areas in the W of Korea from Sinuiji in the N to as far S as the Chinnampo area. System of deployment analyzed asmeans of affording cooperation with infantry units charged with coastal defense. Exception to this found when, after truce of 27 Jul 1953, 101st Armored Regiment moved to the Kaesong area where major elements of the I Corps had recently arrived. Thus, NK armored units, although subordinate to a central hqs for administrative and logistic

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matters, were deployed separately, in support of infantry units. Movement taking place within armored command easily followed by COMINT. Minor reorganizations within command such as enlargement of 156th Tank Battalion into a regiment in early 1953 readily detected. Since all regiments in the NK Armored Command were, up until signing of the truce, located in rear areas, collateral sources found information hard to obtain, and incomplete. At signing of truce, COMINT reflected existence of at least eleven independent armored regiments within armor command. Collateral sources confirmed only seven.

1952-53	Jul to Jul	Per NSA b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36
1952	July	Activation of 20th, 21st, and 22d Coastal Defense Brigades disclosed. Traffic first obtained on the 21st located on W coast of North Korea. 20th and 22d picked up on E coast, subordinate to V Corps. As latter units were located well to rear of frontlines, collateral sources lagged months behind COMINT in detecting their existence.

Per NSA

(b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

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Typical Examples

42d Army received logistic support from 1st Branch Hqs from January 1952 through 4 September 1952. Observed in contact with 5th Branch Hqs from 13 August 1952 through 5 November 1952 indicating a westward movement. Non-appearance on Branch Hqs net after 5 November indicated withdrawal from Korea, however, unit maintained contact with PVA until 10 November. Silence after last call by PVA on 21 November 1952 indicated complete withdrawal of this army from Korea.

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46th Army commenced regular contact with 5th Branch Hqs 12 October 1952. Briefly contacted 1st Branch Hqx, but this was not continued in subsequent call sign periods. On 1 February 1953, contact established with 3d Branch Hq; at same time 40th Army, which had been within 3d Branch Hqs area of responsibility, began contacting 5th Branch Hqs, suggesting that the 46th was about to relieve the 40th on the line. Relief accepted 11 February 1953.

1952	29 Sep-5 Oct	Advance warning and details as to disposition of units, etc. for entire WHITE HORSE MOUNTAIN offensive disclosed (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-3 also provided advance knowledge of the Pork Chop offensive.
1952	October	Partial or complete nets reconstructed and identified for following units: 1st, 2d, 5th, 7th, 8th, 21st Artillery Divisions, an unidentified tank regiment and several AAA units. Continuity being maintained on several unidentified nets.

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		Per NSA (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36
1952	November	T/A passed on net of a battalion located in the area of the 21st Brigade disclosed that it was a reconnaissance battalion of the 10th North Korean Division. (Note: Collateral sources in October 1952 accepted the fact that this division was inactivated) Mention of "regiments" and "divisions" in messages led to the belief that the 10th Division had not really been inactivated. This was subsequently confirmed by captured enemy documents. Collateral sources did not reaccept the 10th Division in North Korean OB until February, 1953.
1953	January	North Korean Artillery Command extensively reorganized. Consisted of 13 anti-aircraft artillery regiments and 5 anti-aircraft artillery battalions, the locations of most of which were known from COMINT material. Analysis showed units of the AAA Department deployed in rear areas in defense of vital supply routes, storage depots, and other civilian and military installations. Units were mobile and could be readily shifted to new positions when the need arose. This was demonstrated by the swift deployment of AAA units at the time of concentrated UN air attacks on North Korean dams and power plants in early July 1952. Units were deployed independently and directly subordinate to AAA Department Hqs, except for a number of regiments in defense of Pyongyang which were organized under the 16th AAA Division.

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Collateral information on AAA organization scanty until April 1953, when a ROK raiding party on the E coast captured one of the independant AAA battalion commanders. Subsequent interrogation of POW confirmed that COMINT information had been right in almost every respect differing only in minor detail.

In most cases, movement of elements of the AAA organization were detected by COMINT as they took place. Immediately prior to and continuing after the signing of the truce agreement, a reorganization of NK AAA forces involving the formation of two new divisions to control the regiments which formerly were directly subordinate to the AAA headquarters was disclosed in traffic. Extensive redeployment of NK AAA elements after the signing of the truce was also detected.

By-product of analysis performed on traffic of AAA units was insight it provided into the growth and organization of parent headquarters, the Artillery Command. Other independent artillery and mortar regiments were known to exist from both COMINT and collateral information, and their unit designations were found to interlace with the designations found in the AAA organization. This indicated existence of a higher headquarters in charge of all artillery, AAA and mortar units. Collateral sources subsequently confirmed these

Per NSA (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

1953 March "OLD BALDY" and "PORK CHOP"

These attacks by the 423d Regiment of the 47th CCF Army centered on key terrain features of the target. Intercept disclosed planning for both on 20 March 1953, three days prior to their taking place. Previous small scale activity in the sector following the regiment's appearance on the line caused a sharp increase in observation which came to be regarded as a primary indication of impending activity by CCFforces. Indications were supported by msgs of 21 March wherein three mobile artillery nets were detected moving to positions near the boundary of the 47th and 23d CCF Armies, within easy range of the targets. Also, it had

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been proven through past experience that the CCF invariably moved additional artillery to support a sizeable action. Each of these indications plus the continued use of position numbers previously identified with Old Baldy and Pork Chop, gave conclusive evidence that the enemy was directing his attention to this area.

On 22 March, the 303d CRB in the I US Corps sector declared Old Baldy a critical area. From traffic intercepted on the moving of the 23d CCF Army which indicated an increased build-up, it became apparent that the scope of enemy activity was to be larger than an attack against one objective. CCF tactical policy was to launch simultaneous limited attacks against nearby positions to divert attention from the main attack. The adjacent area, including the UN-held position of Pork Chop, was also called critical.

The CCF launched their attack against Old Baldy on the evening of 23 March and committed a regiment to overrun the position. At 232125 hours, a msg was intercepted which stated that the CCF would attack in five minutes. This gave UN field commanders the final warning that they needed. Coverage of the action was thorough throughout the four day period. As expected, the CCF hit two positions to the right of the main objective in diversional attacks.

1953 March

The volume of intercepted traffic from any one detachment of the 303d CRB was so limited that the enemy observation and artillery movement appeared insignificant when analyzed in isolation. When all intercepted traffic was combined at the battalion, however, the complete picture was revealed. In sum, indications were:

(1) Close observation after a period of limited activity.
(2) The link-up of artillery nets which were previously scattered across an entire army front.
(3) Artillery forward observers' mention of crossing the river on 22 March. (This was the Yokkok-Chon River.)
(4) The CCF's disclosure of the attack five minutes prior to its inception.

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1953 April

Series of messages intercepted in early April ostensibly reporting on progress of a movement of major elements of the IV NK Corps. At this time, the IV Corps was accepted by both COMINT and collateral agencies in the area SW of Pyongyang. Beginning 21 April and continuing through

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		24 April a number of plain text messages were intercepted on a previously unobserved net which told of movement in the general direction of Kaesong by the 4th and 10th Divisions, IV Corps, and the attached 27th Mortar Regiment of the Artillery Command. The messages appeared quite natural, reporting on the points reached by various units, locations of temporary bivouac areas, road conditions, accidents which occurred, and march discipline. Messages signed by the Corps commander urged that the units move with greater speed. The fact that the messages were sent in plain text caused immediate suspicion. Disclosure of such high level information through a vulnerable means of communication was an almost unbelievable breach of security, and was especially strange in view of stringent security measures imposed upon North Korean radio communications subsequent to the opening of truce negotiations. Accordingly, confirmation of this information was sought from other sources of intelligence. For some time prior to the alleged movement, numberous agent reports had told of a forthcoming movement of the IV NK Corps to the E coast or frontline areas. These reports were mainly based on hearsay and rumor, but some change in mission of the IV Corps had been indicated by resubordinating action of its three coastal defense brigades to the newly formed Auxilliary Command Post of Supreme Headquarters, which was detected in both COMINT and collateral material.
1953	April	Weighing against the indications which tended to support the validity of the plain text messages were the following facts: UN AF flew reconnaissance missions over the areas mentioned, but could find nothing to back up the questionable messages. Also agent and POW reports received during the weeks and months which followed the alleged movement continued to report the 4th and 10th Divisions in their formerly accepted areas. Although there was no evidence in COMINT to deny the validity of the messages, neither was there indications of evidence to confirm it. Finally, there were no indications from any collateral source that a movement of the scope indicated in the plain text messages had taken place, but instead there were rather firm indications that a move had in fact not taken place.

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TOP SECRET

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		This is a classic illustration of an instance when COMINT material could not be accepted at face value, but had to be treated with caution.
1953	May	"OUTPOST TEXAS" Traffic intercepted on the net of an unidentified rocket launcher regiment indicated that the unit was preparing to support an attack by the CCF. The regiment was known to be located just east of the Pukhan-gang. On 26 May a message was intercepted giving the date for the attack as the evening of 27 May. During the evening seven engagements were reported in the 5th ROK Division Sector with the action centered at Outpost Texas. All attacks were successfully repulsed.
1953	June	"OUTPOST HARRY" Indication of enemy action against US 3d Division in the vicinity of Hill 381 observed on 1 June in a message from the 21st Artillery Regiment to its 1st Battalion. Message stated that a meeting was to be held to investigate the setting up of a work mission because there was a combat mission. On 7 June a message stated that all elements of the 1st Battalion would separately participate in combat. This was followed by a message from the 1st Battalion to the regiment which reported that the second company would begin on 10 June while the 1st and 3rd companies would begin on 12 June. On 12 June regiment notified battalion that the 1st company wa in the process of firing for adjustment but statistics for combat on Hill 275 had not been issued. It further stated that the 1st and 3rd companies were to support the 70th Division. Other traffic intercepted on this net led to the belief that the anticipated attack was to be a coordinated effort against UN positions on both Hills 275 and 381. On 12 June, an estimated enemy regiment attacked Outpost Harry, just forward of Hill 381 but were force to withdraw under heavy counterattack. This was followed by a similar attack against the outpost on the night of 12 June and another on 14 June. Immediately following these attacks, three enemy battalions attacked an outpost about 700 meters E of Hill 275. Here again the enemy met defeat.
		"ATTACK AGAINST 1ST ROK DIVISION" On 14 June, a message intercepted on an unidentified net gave indications of an impending attack

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against the 1st ROK Division. On 15 June another message gave the date for the attack as 17 June. Further information was provided in another 15 June message which stated that firing positions were at CT 164 276 and CT 180 255. At this point, heavy rains intervened and numerous delays in the transportation of supplies for the attack occurred. This continued until 21 June when the traffic passed by the net again became concerned with the attack. Although the objective was known, the time for the attack could not be determined. On 26 June, the enemy attacked in division strength along the whole 1st ROK Division front. This resulted in the loss of a few outpost positions.

Per NSA (b)(1),(b)(3):18 U.S.C. 798,(b)(3):50 U.S.C. 403,(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

1953 July

"PORK CHOP"

An unidentified tank regiment passed traffic during the latter part of June and early July which definitely indicated a build-up of artillery and armor in the 67th CCF Division area. This regiment frequently mentioned their positions in the general vicinity of Pork Chop and were noted constructing roads leading to suitable firing positions within range of this target. The date and size of the impending action were of vital interest to UN field commanders and a message received on 6 July stated that time for the overall attack was 2100 hours 6 July. Study of traffic intercepted on the regiments net revealed that at least three tank companies were to be involved in the action thereby indicating an all-out effort to seize Pork Chop. At 2307 hours, on 6 July, two enemy battalions supported by heavy artillery and mortar fire attacked Pork Chop. The enemy continued to reinforce until 11 July when UN forces withdrew. An estimated 3000 Chinese were killed in this action.

"ARROWHEAD"

1953 July

Concurrent with the Pork Chop action, enemy decided to take this position. Action was tipped off by a message from an unidentified rocket launcher regiment on 5 July. On the night of 6 July, an estimated enemy company attacked Arrowhead and the fighting continued through 7 July at which time the enemy was forced to withdraw.

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"BERLIN COMPLEX"

On the night of 19 July, the CCF attacked and successfully overran two friendly outposts, Berlin and East Berlin with two battalions within 45 minutes from "jump off" time. Prior to this limited attack, CCF radio nets operating in thie area passed little traffic other than routine operational transmissions. The call sign count, used as a guage of the number of nets and, therefore, units participating in the area, remained low. Whereas aerial observation reports, POW interrogations and agent reports had usually assisted in corroborating and/or confirming COMINT, only negative data existed in this instance.

Intercept in support of this action did not begin until after the action had been initiated. And, due to the brevity of the engagement, only a relatively light amount of artillery and infantry traffic was received. Radio intercept in this instance was able to provide little aid to the defenders as the CCF accomplished their objectives in a brief time.

The value of intercept related to this action was realized in the follow up rather than the prelude. Following a large volume of tactical traffic pertaining to any one particular action, the CCF normally limited their contacts to the minimum necessary for the consolidation of their newly won positions. After the Berlin action however, a new pattern became evident. Although traffic volume did show a slight decrease, the increased number of CCF radio nets, however, remained constant, an indication that units which had participated in the assualt were remaining in the area for possible further action. Furthermore, CCF observation of UN positions and movements increased considerably, and evidences of CCF reconnaissance patrolling and other movement in this area were intercepted. Recognizing such continued activity as an indication of further impending action, division and corps G-2 were given warning.

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The attack itself came on the night of 24 July. The CCF hit with a regiment forward of Berlin and a battalion on outposts Hedy and Esther. This time, the UN forces, having been forewarned, successfully repulsed several enemy attacks which continued up to the signing of the truce.

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Excellent COMSEC on the part of the enemy throughout this operation denied detection of his intentions and movements despite 24 hour coverage on the part of the intercept teams. When such security was not maintained, as in the first case, a comprehensive picture could be drawn from the material intercepted on radio, not only of the build-up preceding the attack, but of all the tactical elements during this battle.

"KUMSONG OFFENSIVE"

On 13 July, the CCF directed the largest offensive against the UN since their early offensives in 1951. This attack, frequently referred to as "The Battle of the Kumsong Bulge" was fought on that portion of the line which bulged furtherest north of the east-central front just below the CCF held city of Kumsong. This area was being held by five divisions of the ROK Army; namely the 3d, 6th, 8th, 9th and Capitol Divisions.

Information of an impending attack was received through radio intercept on 21 June from the 1st battalion of an unidentified rocket launcher regiment. This unit, known to be in support of the CCF Army, indicated it would assist the 72d CCF Division located in the eastern sector of the 24th CCF Army area. This initial indication of future enemy activity was followed by other message mentioning meetings between the 2d ta Tui, and the 3d ta Tui (74th CCF Division) which at that time was being carried as located in the western portion of the 24th Army sector.

The reference to the 74th Division's participation in a combat mission in the eastern sector was very doubtful at that time; however, prior to the initial attack, several POW's were captured in the Jane Russell Triangle Ridge area which was in the eastern sector of the 24th Army area who gave their parent organization as a regiment numerically subordinate to the 74th Division.

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The shift of the 74th Division to the east, plus the knowledge that the 16th CCF Army was in the immediate rear area behind the 24th Army, and the unusually heavy concentration of artillery units in the 24th, 67th and 68th CCF Army areas, confirmed the assumption that this attack was not to be on a small limited objective scale. Traffic intercepted from 21 June on, continued to support this conclusion.

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On 28 June, a message stated that the combat would be fought in three stages; the first to

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consist of limited probes supported by artillery fire; the second and third phases to be a main attack against enemy positions. A large volume of messages was intercepted during the following 12-14 days which contained statistics on the stockpiling of ammunition, designation of targets results of firing for adjustment, etc.

Meanwhile, spot reports were issued to G-2, IX US Corps by the 304th CRB stating that messages were being intercepted which strongly indicated that: (1) extensive reconnaissance activities were being conducted by CCF troops opposite the 9th and Capitol ROK divisions, possibly in preparation for a forthcoming attack, and (2) a large unit of enemy troops, probably a battalion, of the 215th Regt, 74th Divison, 24th CCF Army, was involved in an impending movement to be supported by an artillery unit which had been moved up for close support.

During the period 1 through 11 July, low level voice intercept continued to gather evidence that the enemy facing the IX US Corps sector was preparing for a large scale offensive. Although the increasingly large volume of intercepted messages failed to reveal the specific date, time and number of troops to be commited in the attack, Corps G-2 was periodically briefed throughout the period concerning the enemy's obvious intentions.

On 10 July, a message was intercepted for the 1st Battalion of the unidentified rocket launcher regiment from Regimental Hqs encouraging all troops to fight to the last man and stating that the whole 74th Division would plunge into combat and not retreat. On the same day, the "tip off" message came, which implied that preparations were to be completed by 12 July. At approximately 2030 hours on 11 July, Corps G-2 was advised that a large scale offensive was possible at any time in the Kumsong Kumhwa sector. It also became discernable that the offensive would not only affect the two ROK Divisions in the IX US Corps sector, but extend into the 6th and 8th ROK Division sectors of the II ROK Corps. The KMAG G-2, II ROK Corps was immediately advised.

Throughout this period, all traffic indicating build-up for a major offensive was passed to the SSR-Eighth Army. All that was needed to complete the picture was the date on which the attack was to be initiated. The Commanding General of the

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Eighth Army was thoroughly briefed on all developments and continually informed on the progress of the enemy's preparations for this offensive as recorded by ASA units whose information was passed through the SSR to the AC of S G-2. All possible defense counter-measures were taken as deemed necessary, by the CG and his staff.

On the evening of 12 July, probing attacks in the form of an intensive artillery barrage were initiated against the 9th, 6th, and Capitol ROK divisions (Eighth Army PIR 1097, 13 July 1953). These concentrated for the most part on targets previously mentioned in intercepted traffic. POW reports stated that elements of three CCF armies would be involved in the attack. On 14 July, these probing attacks increased in size and intensity, spreading across the front to the 8th, 3d and 5th ROK Division sectors (Eighth Army PIR 1098, 14 July 1953). By 16 July, more than seven full divisions from the 24th, 54th, 67th, and 60th CCF Armies were engaged in this major drive against the UN Forces main line of resistance.

Savage fighting continued for fourteen days against the ROK defenders, who bore the brunt of the attack, and when the action ceased, the CCF had just about removed the bulge into their main line of resistance. They had saved face, so to speak, but at the cost of 43,000 casualties.

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